The Coming
Trade War and Global Depression
By
Henry C.K. Liu
First appeared in Asia
Times on Line on June 18 2005
Many historians have
suggested
that the 1929 stock market
crash was not the cause of the Great Depression. If anything, the 1929
crash
was the technical reflection of the inevitable fate of an overblown
bubble
economy. Yet, stock market crashes can recover within a relatively
short time
with the help of effective government monetary measures, as
demonstrated by the
crashes of 1987 (23% drop, recovered in 9 months), 1998 (36% drop,
recovered in
3 months) and 2000-2 (37% drop, recovered in 2 months). Structurally,
the real
cause of the Great Depression, which lasted more than a decade, from
1929 till
the beginning of the Second World War in 1941, was the 1930
Smoot-Hawley
tariffs that put world trade into a tailspin from which it did not
recover
until World War II began. While the US economy finally recovered from
war
mobilization after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1940,
most of the world’s market economies sunk deeper into war-torn distress
and
never fully recovered until the Korea War boom in 1951.
Barely five years into the 21st
century,
with a globlaized
neo-liberal trade regime firmly in place in a world where market
economy has
become the norm, trade protectionism appears to be fast re-emerging and
developing into a new global trade war of complex dimensions. The irony
is that
this new trade war is being launched not by the poor economies that
have been
receiving the short end of the trade stick, but by the US which has
been
winning more than it has been losing on all counts from globalized
neo-liberal
trade, with the EU following suit in locked steps. Japan of course has
never
let up on protectionism and never taken competition policy seriously. The rich nations needs to recognize that in
their effort to squeeze every last drop of advantage out of already
unfair
trade will only plunge the world into deep depression. History has
shown that
while the poor suffer more in economic depressions, the rich, even as
they are
fianancially cushioned by their wealth, are hurt by political
repercussions in
the form of either war or revolution or both.
During the Cold War, there was no international free trade.
The economies of the two contending ideology blocks were completely
disconnected. Within each block, economies
interact through
foreign aid and memorandum trade from their respective superpowers. The competition was not for profit but for
the hearts and minds of the people in the two opposing blocks as well
as those
in the non-aligned nations in the Third World. The competition between
the two
superpowers was to give rather than to take from their separate
fraternal
economies.
The population of the
superpowers worked hard to help the poorer people within their separate
blocks
and convergence toward equality was the policy aim even if not always
the
practice. The Cold War era of foreign aid and memorandum trade had a
better
record of poverty reduction in either camps than post-Cold War
globalized
neo-liberal trade dominated by one single superpower. The aim was not
only to
raise income and increase wealth, but also to close income and wealth
disparity
between and within economies. Today,
income and wealth disparity is rationalized as a necessity for capital
formation. The New York Time reports that from 1980 to 2002, the total
income
earned by the top 0.1% of earners in the US more than doubled, while
the share
earned by everyone else in the top 10% rose far less and the share of
the
bottom 90% declined.
For all its ill effects, the Cold War achieved two
formidable ends: it prevented nuclear war and it introduced development
as a
moral imperative into superpower geo-political competition with rising
economic
equality within each block. In the years
since the end of the Cold War, nuclear terrorism has emerged as a
serious
threat and domestic development is pre-empted by global trade even in
the rich
economies while income and wealth disparity has widened everywhere.
Since the end of the Cold War some fifteen
years ago, world economic
growth has shifted to rely exclusively on globalized neo-liberal trade
engineered and led by the US as the sole remaining superpower, financed
with
the US dollar as the main reserve currency for trade and anchored by
the huge
US consumer market made possible by the high wages of US workers. This growth has been sustained by knocking
down national tariffs everywhere around the world through supranational
institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and financed
by a
deregulated foreign exchange market working in concert with a global
central
banking regime independent of local political pressure, lorded over by
the
supranational Bank of International Settlement (BIS) and the
International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Redefining humanist
morality, the US asserts that world
trade is a moral imperative and as such trade promotes democracy,
political
freedom and respect for human rights in trade participating nations. Unfortunately, income and wealth equality are
not among the benefits promoted by trade. Even
if the validity of this twisted
ideological assertion is not
questioned, it clearly contradicts US practice of trade embargo against
countries the US deems undemocratic, lacking in political freedom and
deficient
in respect for human rights. If trade
promotes such desirable conditions, such practice of linking trade to
freedom
is tantamount to denying medicine to the sick.
President George W Bush defended his free trade agenda in
moralistic terms. “Open trade is not just an economic opportunity, it
is a
moral imperative,” he declared in a May 7, 2001 speech. “Trade creates
jobs for
the unemployed. When we negotiate for open markets, we’re providing new
hope
for the world’s poor. And when we promote open trade, we are promoting
political freedom.” Such claims remain
highly controversial when tested by actual data.
Phyllis Schlafly,
syndicated
conservative columnist,
responded three weeks later in an article: Free
Trade is an Economic Issue, Not a Moral One. In
it, she notes while conservatives should
be happy to finally have a president who adds a moral dimension to his
actions,
“the Bible does not instruct us on free trade and it’s not one of the
Ten
Commandments. Jesus did not tell us to follow Him along the road to
free trade.
… Nor is there anything in the U.S. Constitution that requires us to
support
free trade and to abhor protectionism. In fact, protectionism was the
economic
system believed in and practiced by the framers of our Constitution.
Protective
tariffs were the principal source of revenue for our federal government
from
its beginning in 1789 until the passage of the 16th Amendment, which
created
the federal income tax, in 1913. Were all those public officials during
those
hundred-plus years remiss in not adhering to a “moral obligation” of
free
trade?” Hardly, argues Schlafly whose
views are noteworthy because US politics is currently enmeshed in a
struggle
between strict-constructionist paleo-conservatives and
moral-imperialist
neo-conservatives. Despite the
ascendance of neo-imperialism in US foreign policy, protectionism
remains
strong in US political culture, particularly among conservatives and in
the
labor movement.
Bush also said China,
which
reached a trade agreement with
the US at the close of the Clinton administration, and became a member
of the
WTO in late 2001, would benefit from political changes as a result of
liberalized trade policies. This
pronouncement gives clear evidence to those in China who see foreign
trade as
part of an anti-China “peaceful evolution” strategy first envisioned by
John
Forster Dulles, US Secretary of State under Eisenhower in the 1950s. It
is a
strategy of inducing through peaceful trade the Communist Party of
China (CPC) to
reform itself out of power and to eliminate the dictatorship of the
proletariat
in favor of bourgeois liberalization. Almost
four decades later, Deng Xiaoping
criticized CPC Chairman Hu
Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang for having failed to contain bourgeois
liberalization in their implementation of China’s modernization policy.
Deng
warned in November 1989, five months after the Tiananmen incident: “The
Western
imperialist countries are staging a third world war without guns. They
want to
bring about the peaceful evolution of socialist countries towards
capitalism.” Deng’s handling of the
Tiananmen incident
prevented China from going the catastrophic route of the USSR which
dissolved
in 1991.
Yet it is clear that
political
freedom is often the first
casualty of a garrison state mentality and such mentality inevitably
results
from hostile US economic and security policy toward any country the US
deems as
not free. Whenever the US pronounces a
nation to be not free, that nation will become less free as a result of
US
policy. This has been repeatedly evident in China and elsewhere in the
Third
World. Whenever US policy toward China
turns hostile, as it currently appears to be heading, political and
press
freedom inevitably face stricter curbs. For trade to mutually and truly
benefit
the trading economies, three conditions are necessary: 1) the
de-linking of
trade from ideological/political objectives, 2) equality must be
maintained in
the terms of trade and 3) recognition that global full employment at
rising, living
wages is the prerequisite for true comparative advantage in global
trade.
The developing rupture
between
the sole superpower and its
traditionally deferential allies lies in mounting trade conflicts. The
US has
benefited from an international financial architecture that gives the
US
economy a structural monetary advantage over those of the EU and Japan,
not to
mention the rest of the world. Trade
issues range from government subsidies disputes between Airbus and
Boeing,
banana, sugar, beef, oranges, steel, as well as disputes over fair
competition
associated with mergers and acquisition and financial services. If
either
government is found to be in breach of WTO rules when these disputes
wind
through long processes of judgment, the other will be authorized to
retaliate.
The US could put tariffs on other European goods if the WTO rules
against
Airbus and vice versa. So if both governments are found in breach, both
could
retaliate, leading to a cycle of offensive protectionism. When the US
was ruled
to have unfairly supported its steel industry, tariffs were slapped by
the EU
on Florida oranges to make a political point in a politically important
state
in US politics.
Trade competition
between the EU
and the US is spilling over
into security areas, allowing economic interests to conflict with
ideological
sympathy. Both of these production
engines, saddled with serious overcapacity, are desperately seeking new
markets, which inevitably leads them to Asia in general and China in
particular, with its phenomenal growth rate and its 1.2 billion eager
consumers
bulging with rapidly rising disposable income. The
growth of the Chinese economy will lift
all other economies in Asia,
including Australia which has only recently begun to understand that
its future
cannot be separated from its geographic location and that its
prosperity is
interdependent with those of other Asian economies. Australian iron
ores, beef
and dairy products are destined for China, not the British Isles. The
EU is
eager to lift its 15-year-old arms embargo on China, much to the
displeasure of
the US. Israel faces similar dilemma in its close relations with the US
on
military sales to China. Even the US defense establishment has largely
come
around to the view that US arms industry must export, even to China, to
remain
on top. The Bangkok Post reported on June 7 that Rumsfeld tried to sell
to
Thailand F-16 warplanes capable of firing advanced medium-range
air-to-air
missiles (AMRAAMs) two days after he lashed out in Singapore at China
for
upgrading its own military when no neighboring nations are threatening
it. The
sales pitch was in competition with Russian-made Sukhoi SU-30s and
Swedish
JAS-39s. The open competition in arms export had been spelled out for
Congress years
earlier by Donald Hicks, a leading Pentagon technologist in the Reagan
administration.
“Globalization is not a policy option, but a fact to which policymakers
must
adapt,” he said. “The emerging reality is that all nations’ militaries
are
sharing essentially the same global commercial-defense industrial base.” The boots and uniforms worn by US soldiers in
Afghanistan and Iraq were made in China.
The WTO is the only
global
international organization
dealing with the rules of trade between its 148 member nations. At its
heart
are the WTO agreements, known as the multilateral trading system,
negotiated
and signed by the majority of the world’s trading nations and ratified
in their
parliaments. The stated goal is to help producers of goods and
services,
exporters, and importers conduct their business, with the dubious
assumption
that trade automatically brings equal benefits to all participants. The welfare of the people is viewed only as a
collateral aim based on the doctrinal fantasy that “balanced” trade
inevitably
brings prosperity equally to all, a claim that has been contradicted by
facts
produced by the very terms of trade promoted by the WTO itself.
Two decades of
neo-liberal
globalized trade have widened
income and wealth disparity within and between nations. Free trade has
turned
out not to be the win-win game promised by neo-liberals.
It is very much a win-lose game, with heads,
the rich economies win, and tails, the poor economies lose. Domestic
development has been marginalized as a hapless victim of foreign trade,
dependent on trade surplus for capital. Foreign
trade and foreign investment have
become the prerequisite
engines for domestic development. This trade model condemns those
economies
with trade deficits to perpetual underdevelopment.
Because of dollar hegemony, all foreign
investment
goes only to the export sector where dollars can be earned. Even the economies with trade surpluses
cannot use their dollar trade earnings for domestic development, as
they are
forced to hold huge dollar reserves to support the exchange rate of
their
currencies.
In the fifth WTO
Ministerial
Conference held in Cancun in
September 2003, the richer countries rejected the demands of poorer
nations for
radical reform of agricultural subsidies that have decimated Third
World
agriculture. Failure to get the Doha round back on track after the
collapse of
Cancun runs the danger of a global resurgence of protectionism, with
the US
leading the way. Larry Elliott reported
on October 13, 2003 in The Guardian
on the failed 2003 Cancun Ministerial meeting: “The language of
globalization
is all about democracy, free trade and sharing the benefits of
technological
advance. The reality is about rule by elites, mercantilism and
selfishness.”
Elliot noted that the process is full of paradoxes: why is it that in a
world
where human capital is supposed to be the new wealth of nations, labor
is
treated with such contempt?
Sam Mpasu, Malawi’s
commerce and
industry minister, asked at
Cancun for his comments about the benefits of trade liberalization,
replied
dryly: “We have opened our economy. That’s why we are flat on our
back.”
Mpasu’s comments summarize the wide chasm that divides the perspectives
of
those who write the rules of globalization and those who are powerless
to
resist them.
Exports of
manufactures by
low-wage developing countries
have increased rapidly over the last 3 decades due in part to falling
tariffs
and declining transport costs that enable outsourcing based on wage
arbitrage.
It grew from 25% in 1965 to nearly 75% over three decades, while
agriculture’s
share of developing country exports has fallen from 50% to under 10%. Many developing countries have gained
relatively little from increased manufactures trade, with most of the
profit
going to foreign capital. Market access for their most competitive
manufactured
export, such as textile and apparel, remains highly restricted and
recent trade
disputes threaten further restrictions. Still, the key cause of
unemployment in
all developing economies is the trade-related collapse of agriculture,
exacerbated by the massive government subsidies provided to farmers in
rich
economies. Many poor economies are
predominantly agriculturally based and a collapse of agriculture means
a
general collapse of the whole economy.
The Doha Development
Agenda
(DDA) negotiations, sponsored by
the WTO, collapsed in Cancun, Mexico over the question of government
support
for agriculture in rich economies and its potential impacts on causing
more
poverty in developing countries. The Doha negotiations since Cancun are
focused
on the need to better understand the linkages between trade policies,
particularly those of the rich economies, and poverty in the developing
world. While poverty reduction is now
more widely accepted by establishment economists as a necessary central
focus
for development efforts and has become the main mission of the World
Bank and
other development institutions, very little effective measures have
been
forthcoming. The UN Millennium Development Goals (UNMDG) commits the
international community to halve world poverty by 2015, a decade from
now. With
current trends, that goal is likely to be achievable only through death
of half
of the poor by starvation, disease and local conflicts.
The UN Development Program warns
that 3 million children will die in
sub-Saharan
Africa alone by 2015 if the world continues on its current path of
failing to
meet the UNMDG agreed to in 2000.
Several
key venues to this goal are located in international trade where the
record of
poverty reduction has been exceedingly poor, if not outright negative. The fundamental question whether trade can
replace or even augment socio-economic development remains unasked, let
alone
answered. Until such issues are
earnestly addressed, protectionism will re-emerge in the poor countries. Under such conditions, if democracy expresses
the will of the people, democracy will demand protectionism more than
government by elite.
While tariffs in the
past decade
have been coming down like
leaves in autumn, flexible exchange rates have become a form of virtual
countervailing tariff. In the current
globalized neo-liberal trade regime operating in a deregulated global
foreign
exchange market, the exchanged value of a currency is regularly used to
balance
trade through government intervention in currency market fluctuations
against
the world’s main reserve currency – the dollar, as the head of the
international monetary snake.
Purchasing power
parity (PPP)
measures the
disconnection between exchange rates and local prices. PPP contrasts
with the
interest rate parity (IRP) theory which assumes that the actions of
investors,
whose transactions are recorded on the capital account, induces changes
in the
exchange rate. For a dollar investor to earn the same interest rate in
a
foreign economy with a PPP of four times, such as the purchasing power
parity
between the US dollar and the Chinese yuan, local wages would have to
be at
least 4 time lower than US wages.
<>PPP
theory is based on an extension and variation of the "law of one
price" as applied to the aggregate economy. The
law of one price says that identical
goods should sell for the same price in two separate markets when there
are no
transportation costs and no differential taxes applied in the two
markets. But the law of one price does not
apply to the
price of labor. Price arbitrage is the opposite of wage arbitrage in
that
producers seek to make their goods in the lowest wage locations and to
sell
their goods in the highest price markets. This
is the incentive for outsourcing which
never seeks to sell products
locally at prices that reflect PPP differentials.
What is not generally noticed is that price
deflation in an economy increases its PPP, in that the same local
currency buys
more. But the cross-border one price phenomenon applies only to certain
products, such as oil, thus for a PPP of 4 times, a rise in oil prices
will
cost the Chinese economy 4 times the equivalent in other goods, or
wages than
in the US. The larger the purchasing
power parity between a local currency and the dollar, the more severe
is the
tyranny of dollar hegemony on forcing down wage differentials.
Ever since 1971, when US president Richard Nixon, under
pressure from persistent fiscal and trade deficits that drained US gold
reserves, took the dollar off the gold standard (at $35 per ounce), the
dollar
has been a fiat currency of a country of little fiscal or monetary
discipline.
The Bretton Woods Conference at the end of World War II established the
dollar,
a solid currency backed by gold, as a benchmark currency for financing
international trade, with all other currencies pegged to it at fixed
rates that
changed only infrequently. The fixed
exchange rate regime was designed to keep trading nations honest and
prevent
them from running perpetual trade deficits. It was not expected to
dictate the
living standards of trading economies, which were measured by many
other
factors besides exchange rates.
Bretton Woods was conceived when conventional
wisdom in international economics did not consider cross-border flow of
funds
necessary or desirable for financing world trade precise for this
reason. Since
1971, the dollar has changed from a gold-back currency to a global
reserve
monetary instrument that the US, and only the US, can produce by fiat. At the same time, the US continued to incur
both current account and fiscal deficits. That was the beginning of
dollar
hegemony.
With deregulation of foreign exchange and financial markets, many
currencies began to free float against the dollar not in response to
market
forces but to maintain export competitiveness. Government
interventions in foreign exchange
markets became a regular
last resort option for many trading economies for their preserving
export
competitiveness and for resisting the effect of dollar hegemony on
domestic
living standards.
World trade under dollar hegemony is a game in which the US produces
paper
dollars and the rest of the world produce real things that paper
dollars can
buy. The world’s interlinked economies no longer trade to capture
comparative
advantage; they compete in exports to capture needed dollars to service
dollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar reserves to
sustain
the exchange value of their domestic currencies in foreign exchange
markets. To
prevent speculative and manipulative attacks on their currencies in
deregulated
markets, the world’s central banks must acquire and hold dollar
reserves in
corresponding amounts to market pressure on their currencies in
circulation.
The higher the market pressure to devalue a particular currency, the
more
dollar reserves its central bank must hold. This creates a built-in
support for
a strong dollar that in turn forces all central banks to acquire and
hold more
dollar reserves, making it stronger. This anomalous phenomenon is known
as
dollar hegemony, which is created by the geopolitically constructed
peculiarity
that critical commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in
dollars.
Everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy oil. The denomination
of oil
in dollars and the recycling of petro-dollars is the price the US has
extracted
from oil-producing countries for US tolerance of the oil-exporting
cartel since
1973.
By definition, dollar reserves must be invested in dollar-denominated
assets,
creating a capital-accounts surplus for the US economy. A strong-dollar
policy
is in the US national interest because it keeps US inflation low
through
low-cost imports and it makes US assets denominated in dollars
expensive for
foreign investors. This arrangement, which Federal Reserve Board
chairman Alan
Greenspan proudly calls US financial hegemony in congressional
testimony, has
kept the US economy booming in the face of recurrent financial crises
in the
rest of the world. It has distorted globalization into a “race to the
bottom”
process of exploiting the lowest labor costs and the highest
environmental
abuse worldwide to produce items and produce for export to US markets
in a
quest for the almighty dollar, which has not been backed by gold since
1971,
nor by economic fundamentals for more than a decade. The adverse
effects of
this type of globalization on the developing economies are obvious. It
robs
them of the meager fruits of their exports and keeps their domestic
economies
starved for capital, as all surplus dollars must be reinvested in US
treasuries
to prevent the collapse of their own domestic currencies.
The adverse effect of this type of globalization on the US economy is
also
becoming clear. In order to act as consumer of last resort for the
whole world,
the US economy has been pushed into a debt bubble that thrives on
conspicuous
consumption and fraudulent accounting. The unsustainable and irrational
rise of
US equity and real estate prices, unsupported by revenue or profit, had
merely
been a de facto devaluation of the dollar. Ironically, the recent fall
in US
equity prices from its 2004 peak and the anticipated fall in real
estate prices
reflect a trend to an even stronger dollar, as it can buy more deflated
shares
and properties for the same amount of dollars. The rise in the
purchasing power
of the dollar inside the US impacts its purchasing power disparity with
other
currencies unevenly, causing sharp price instability in the economies
with
freely exchangeable currencies and fixed exchange rates, such as Hong
Kong and
until recently Argentina. For the US,
falling exchange rate of the dollar actually causes asset prices to
rise. Thus
with a debt bubble in the US economy, a strong dollar is not in the US
national
interest. Debt has turned US policy on
the dollar on its head.
The setting of exchange values of currencies is practiced
not only by sovereign governments on their own currencies as a
sovereign
right. The US, exploiting dollar
hegemony, usurps the privilege of dictating the exchange value of all
foreign
currencies to support its own economic nationalism in the name of
global free
trade. And US position on exchange rates has not been consistent. When
the
dollar was rising, as it did in the 1980s, the US, to protect its
export trade,
hailed the stabilizing wisdom of fixed exchange rates.
When the dollar falls as it has been in
recent years, the US, to deflect the blame of its trade deficit,
attacks fixed
exchange rates as currency manipulation, as it targets China’s currency
now
which has been pegged to the dollar for over a decade, since the dollar
was
lower. How can a nation manipulate the exchange value of its currency
when it
is pegged to the dollar at the same rate over long periods? Any manipulation came from the dollar, not
the yuan.
The recent rise of the euro against the dollar, the first
appreciation wave since its introduction on January 1, 2002, is the
result of
an EU version of the 1985 Plaza Accord on the Japanese yen, albeit
without a
formal accord. The strategic purpose is
more than merely moderating the US trade deficit. The
record shows that even with the 30% drop
of the dollar against the euro, the US trade deficit has continued to
climb.
The strategic purpose of driving up the euro is to reduce the euro to
the
status of the yen, as a subordinated currency to dollar hegemony. The real effect of the Plaza Accord was to
shift the cost of support for the dollar-denominated US trade deficit,
and the
socio-economic pain associated with that support, from the US to Japan.
What is happening to the euro now is far from
being the beginning of the demise of the dollar. Rather,
it is the beginning of the reduction
of the euro into a subservient currency to the dollar to support the US
debt
bubble. Six and a half years since the launch of European Monetary
Union, the
eurozone is trapped in an environment in which monetary policy of sound
money
has in effect become destructive and supply-side fiscal policy
unsustainable.
National economies are beginning to refuse to bear the pain needed for
adjustment to globalization or the EU’s ambitious enlargement. The European nations are beginning to resist
the US strategy to make the euro economy a captive supporter of a
rising or
falling dollar as such movements fit the shifting needs of US economic
nationalism.
It is the modern-day monetary equivalent of the brilliant
Roman strategy of making a dissident Jew a Christian god, to pre-empt
Judaism’s
rising cultural domination over Roman civilization. Roman law, the
foundation
of the Roman Empire, gained in sophistication from being influenced by
if not
directly derived from Jewish Talmudic law, particularly on the concept
of
equity - an eye for an eye. The Jews had devised a legal system
based on
the dignity of the individual and equality before the law four century
before
Christ. There was no written Roman law
until two centuries B.C. The Roman law of obligatio was
not conducive to finance as it held that all
indebtedness was personal,
without institutional status. A creditor
could not sell a note of indebtedness to another party and a debtor did
not
have to pay anyone except the original creditor. Talmudic law, on the
other
hand, recognized impersonal credit and a debt had to be paid to whoever
presented the demand note. This was a key development of modern
finance. With
the Talmud, the Jews under the Diaspora had an international law that
spans
three continents and many cultures.<>
The Romans were faced with a dilemma. Secular Jewish ideas
and values were permeating Roman society, but Judaism was an exclusive
religion
that the Romans were not permitted to join. The Romans could not
assimilate the Jews as they did the more civilized Greeks. Early
Christianity
also kept its exclusionary trait until Paul who opened Christianity to
all. Historian Edward Gibbon (1737-94)
noted that the Rome recognized the Jews as a nation and as such were
entitled
to religious peculiarities. The
Christians on the other hand were a sect, and being without a nation,
subverted
other nations. The Roman Jews were active
in government and when not resisting Rome against social injustice,
fought side
by side with Roman legionnaires to preserve the empire.
Roman Jews were good Roman citizens. By contrast, the early Christians were social
dropouts, refused responsibility in government and civic affairs and
were
conscientious objectors and pacifists in a militant culture. Gibbon noted that Rome felt that the crime of
a Christian was not in what he did, but in being who he was.
Christianity
gained control of Roman culture and society long before Constantine who
in 324
A.D. sanctioned it with political legitimacy and power after
recognizing its
power in helping to win wars against pagans, the way Pope Urban II in
1095 used
the crusade to keep Papal temporal power longer. When early
Christianity,
a secular Jewish dissident sect, began to move up from the lower strata
of
Roman society and began to find converts in the upper echelons, the
Roman
polity adopted Christianity, the least objectionable of all Jewish
sects, as a
state religion. Gibbons estimated that Christians killed more of
their own
members over religious disputes in the three centuries after coming to
secular
power than did the Romans in three previous centuries.
Persecution of the Jews began in
Christianized Rome. The disdain held by
early Christianity on centralized government gave rise to monasticism
and
contributed to the fall of the Roman Empire.
By allowing a trade surplus denominated in dollars to be
accumulated by non-dollar economies, such as yen, euro, or now the
Chinese
yuan, the cost of supporting the appropriate value of the dollar to
sustain
perpetual economic growth in the dollar economy is then shifted to
these
non-dollar economies, which manifests themselves in perpetual relative
low
wages and weak domestic consumption. For
already high-wage EU and Japan, the penalty is the reduction of social
welfare
benefits and job security traditional to these economies. For China,
now the
world’s second largest creditor nation, it is reduced to having to ask
the US,
the world’s largest debtor nation, for capital denominated in dollars
the US
can print at will to finance its export trade to a US running recurring
trade
deficits.<>
The IMF, which has been ferocious in imposing draconian
fiscal and monetary “conditionalities” on all debtor nations everywhere
in the
decade after the Cold War, is nowhere to be seen on the scene in the
world’s
most fragrantly irresponsible debtor nation. This
is because the US can print dollars at
will and with immunity. The dollar is a
fiat currency not backed by
gold, not backed by US productivity, not back by US export prowess, but
by US
military power. The US military budget
request for Fiscal Year 2005 is $420.7 billion. For Fiscal Year 2004,
it was
$399.1 billion; for 2003, $396.1 billion; for 2002, $343.2 billion and
for
2001, $310 billion. In the first term of
the Bush presidency, the US spent $1.5 trillion on its military. That is bigger than the entire GDP of China
in 2004. The US trade deficit is around 6% of its GDP while it military
budget
is around 4%. In other words, the
trading partners of the US are paying for one and a half times of the
cost of a
military that can someday be used against any one of them for any
number of
reasons, including trade disputes. The
anti-dollar crowd has nothing to celebrate about the recurring US trade
deficit.
It is pathetic that US Secretary of Defense Donald H
Rumsfeld tries to persuade the world that China’s military budget,
which is
less that one tenth of that of the US, is a threat to Asia, even when
he is
forced to acknowledge that Chinese military modernization is mostly
focused on
defending its coastal territories, not on force projection for distant
conflicts, as is US military doctrine. While
Rumsfeld urges more political freedom in
China, his militant posture
toward China is directly counterproductive towards that goal.
Ironically,
Rumsfeld chose to make his case about political freedom in Singapore,
the
bastion of Confucian authoritarianism.
Normally, according to free trade theory, trade can only
stay unbalanced temporarily before equilibrium is re-established or
free trade
would simply stop. When bilateral trade is temporarily unbalanced, it
is
generally because one trade partner has become temporarily
uncompetitive,
inefficient or unproductive. The partner with the trade deficit
receives more
goods and services from the partner with the trade surplus than it can
offer in
return and thus pays the difference with its currency that someday can
buy
foods produced by the deficit trade partner to re-established balance
of
payments. This temporary trade imbalance
is due to a number of socio-economic factors, such as terms of trade,
wage
levels, return on investment, regulatory regimes, shortages in labor or
material or energy, trade-supporting infrastructure adequacy,
purchasing power
disparity, etc. A trading partner that
runs a recurring trade deficit earns the reputation of being what banks
call a
habitual borrower, i.e. a bad credit risk, one who habitually lives
beyond
his/her means. If the trade deficit is paid with its currency, a
downward pressure
results in the exchange rate. A flexible exchange rate seeks to remove
or
moderate a temporary trade imbalance while the productivity disparities
between
trading partners are being addressed fundamentally.
Dollar hegemony prevents US trade imbalance from returning
to equilibrium through market forces. It allows a US trade deficit to
persist
based on monetary prowess. This translates over time into a falling
exchange
rate for the dollar even as dollar hegemony keeps the fall at a slow
pace. But
a below-par exchange rate over a long period can run the risk of
turning the
temporary imbalance in productivity into a permanent one.
A continuously weakening currency condemns
the issuing economy into a downward economic spiral. This has happened
to the US
in the last decade. To make matters worse, with globalization of
deregulated
markets, the recurring US trade deficit is accompanied by an escalating
loss of
jobs in sectors sensitive to cross-border wage arbitrage, with the
job-loss
escalation climbing up the skill ladder. Discriminatory
US immigration policies also
prevent the retention of
low-paying jobs within the US and exacerbate the illegal immigration
problem.
Regional wage arbitrage within the US in past decades kept
the US economy lean and productive internationally.
Labor-intensive US industries relocated to
the low-wage South through regional wage arbitrage and despite
temporary
adjustment pains from the loss of textile mills, the Northern economies
managed
to upgrade their productivity, technology level, financial
sophistication and
output quality. The Southern economies in the US also managed to
upgrade these
factors of production and in time managed to narrow the wage disparity
within
the national economy. This happened because the jobs stay within the
nation.
With globalization, it is another story. Jobs
are leaving the nation mercilessly.
According to free trade theory,
the US trade deficit is supposed to cause the dollar to fall
temporarily against
the currencies of its trading partners, causing export competitiveness
to
rebalance to remove or reduce the US trade deficit or face the collapse
of its
currency. Either case, jobs that have
been lost temporarily are then supposed to return to the US.
But the persistent US trade deficit defies trade theory
because of dollar hegemony. The current international finance
architecture is
based on dollar hegemony which is the peculiar arrangement in which the
US
dollar, a fiat currency, remains as the dominant reserve currency for
international trade. The broad trade-weighted dollar index stays in an
upward
trend, despite selective appreciation of some strong currencies, as
highly-indebted emerging market economies attempt to extricate
themselves from
dollar-denominated debt through the devaluation of their currencies.
While the
aim is to subsidize exports, it ironically makes dollar debts more
expensive in
local currency terms. The moderating impact on US price inflation also
amplifies the upward trend of the trade-weighted dollar index despite
persistent
US expansion of monetary aggregates, also known as monetary easing or
money
printing.
Adjusting for this debt-driven increase in the exchange value of
dollars, the
import volume into the US can be estimated in relationship to expanding
monetary aggregates. The annual growth of the volume of goods shipped
to the US
has remained around 15% for most of the 1990s, more than 5 times the
average
annual GDP growth. The US enjoyed a booming economy when the dollar was
gaining
ground, and this occurred at a time when interest rates in the US were
higher
than those in its creditor nations. This led to the odd effect that
raising US
interest rates actually prolonged the boom in the US rather than
threatened it,
because it caused massive inflows of liquidity into the US financial
system,
lowered import price inflation, increased apparent productivity and
prompted
further spending by US consumers enriched by the wealth effect despite
a
slowing of wage increases. Returns on
dollar assets stayed high in foreign currency terms.
This was precisely what Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan
did in
the 1990s in the name of pre-emptive measures against inflation. Dollar
hegemony enabled the US to print money to fight inflation, causing a
debt
bubble of asset appreciation. This data substantiated the view of the
US as
Rome in a New Roman Empire with an unending stream of imports as the
free
tribune from conquered lands. This was what Greenspan meant by US
“financial
hegemony.”
The Fed Funds rate (ffr) target has been lifted eight times
in steps of 25 basis points from 1% in mid 2004 to 3% on May 3, 2005. If the same pattern of “measured pace”
continues, the ffr target would be at 4.25% by the end of 2005. Despite
Fed rhetoric,
the lifting of dollar interest rate has more to do with preventing
foreign
central banks from selling dollar-denominated assets, such as US
Treasuries,
than with fighting inflation. In a
debt-driven economy, high interest rates are themselves inflationary. Rising interest rate to fight inflation could
become the monetary dog chasing its own interest rate tail, with rising
rate
adding to rising inflation which then requires more interest rate
hikes. Still,
interest rate policy is a double edged sword: it keeps funds from
leaving the
debt bubble, but it can also puncture the debt bubble by making the
servicing
of debt prohibitively expensive.
To prevent this last adverse effect, the Fed adds to the
money supply, creating an unnatural condition of abundant liquidity
with rising
short-term interest rate, resulting in a narrowing of interest spread
between
short-term and long-term debts, a leading indication for inevitable
recession
down the road. The problem of adding to
the money supply is what Keynes called the liquidity trap, that is, an
absolute
preference for liquidity even at near zero interest-rate levels. Keynes
argued
that either a liquidity trap or interest-insensitive investment draught
could
render monetary expansion ineffective in a recession. It is what is
popularly
called pushing on a credit string, where ample money cannot find
credit-worthy
willing borrowers. Much of the new low
cost money tends to go to refinancing of existing debt take out at
previously
higher interest rates. Rising short-term interest rates, particularly
at a
measured pace, would not remove the liquidity trap when long term rates
stay
flat because of excess liguidity.
The debt bubble in the US is clearly having problems, as
evident in the bond market. With just 14 deals worth $2.9 billion, May
2005 was
the slowest month for high-yield bond issuance since October 2002. The
late-April downgrades of the debt of General Motors and Ford Motor to
junk
status roiled the bond markets. The number of high-yield, or junk bond
deals
fell 55% in the March-to-May 2005 period, compared with the same three
months
in 2004. They were also down 45% from the December-through-February
period. In
dollar value, junk bond deals totaled $17.6 billion in the March-to-May
2005
period, compared with $39.5 billion during the same three months in
2004 and
$36 billion from December through February 2005. There
were 407 deals of investment-grade bond
underwriting during the March-to-May 2005 period, compared with 522 in
the same
period 2004 - a decline of 22%. In dollar volume, some $153.9 billion
of
high-grade bonds were underwritten from March to May 2005, compared
with $165.5
billion in the same period in 2004 - a 7% decline. Oil at $50, along
with
astronomical asset price appreciation, particularly in real estate, is
giving
the debt bubble additional borrowed time. But this game cannot go on
forever
and the end will likely be triggered by a new trade war’s effect on
reduced
trade volume. The price of a reduced US
trade deficit is the bursting of the US debt bubble which can plunge
the world
economy into a new depression. Given
such options, the US has no choice except to ride the trade deficit
train for
as long as the traffic will bear, which may not be too long,
particularly if
protectionism begins to gather force.
The transition to offshore outsourced production has been the source of
the
productivity boom of the “New Economy” in the US in the last decade.
The
productivity increase not attributable to the importing of other
nations’
productivity is much less impressive. While published government
figures of the
productivity index show a rise of nearly 70% since 1974, the actual
rise is
between zero and 10% in many sectors if the effect of imports is
removed from
the equation. The lower productivity values are consistent with the
real-life
experience of members of the blue-collar working class and the white
collar
middle class who have been spending the equity cash-outs from the
appreciated
market value of their homes. World trade has become a network of
cross-border
arbitrage on differentials in labor availability, wages, interest
rates,
exchange rates, prices, saving rates, productive capacities, liquidity
conditions and debt levels. In some of these areas, the US is becoming
an
underdeveloped economy.
The Bush Administration continues to assure the public that
the state of the economy is sound while in reality the US has been
losing
entire sectors of its economy, such as manufacturing and information
technology, to foreign producers, while at the same time selling off
the part
of the nation to finance its rising and unending trade deficit.
Usually, when
unjustified confidence crosses over to fantasized hubris on the part of
policymakers, disaster is not far ahead.
To be fair, the problems of the US economy started before
the second Bush Administration. The Clinton Administration’s annual
economic
report for 2000 claimed that the longest economic expansion in US
history could
continue “indefinitely” as long as “we stick to sound policy”,
according to
Chairman Martin Baily of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) as
reported in
the Wall Street Journal. The
New
York Times report differed somewhat by quoting Baily as saying:
“stick to
fiscal policy.” Putting the two
newspaper reports together, one got the sense that the Clinton
Administration
thought that its fiscal policy was the sound policy needed to put an
end to the
business cycle. Economics high priests in government, unlike the rest
of us
mortals who are unfortunate enough to have to float in the daily
turbulence of
the market, can afford to aloofly focus on long-term trends and their
structural congruence to macro-economic theories. Yet, outside of
macro-economics, long-term is increasingly being re-defined in the real
world. In the technology and
communication sectors, long-term evokes periods lasting less than 5
years. For hedge funds and quant shops,
long-term
can mean a matter of weeks.
Two factors were identified by the Clinton CEA Year 2000
economic report as contributing to the “good” news:
technology-driven productivity and
neo-liberal trade globalization. Even with somewhat slower productivity
and
spending growth, the CEA believed the economy could continue to expand
perpetually. As for the huge and growing trade deficit, the CEA
expected global
recovery to boost demand for US exports, not withstanding the fact that
most US
exports are increasingly composed of imported parts. Yet the US has
long
officially pursued a strong dollar policy which weakens world demand
for US
exports. The high expectation on e-commerce was a big part of optimism,
which
had yet to be substantiated by data. In 2000, the CEA expected the
business to
business (B2B) portion of e-commerce to rise to $1.3 trillion by 2003
from $43
billion in 1998. Goldman Sachs claimed in 1999 that B2B e-commerce
would reach
$1.5 trillion by 2004, twice the size of the combined 1998 revenues of
the US
auto industry and the US telecom sector. Others
were more cautious. Jupiter Research
projected that companies
around the globe would increase their spending on B2B e-marketplaces
from
US$2.6 billion in 2000 to only $137.2 billion by 2005 and spending in
North
America alone would grow from $2.1 billion to only $80.9 billion. North
American companies accounted for 81% of the total spending in 1998, but
by
2005, that figure was expected to drop to 60% of the total. The fact of
the
matter is that Asia and Europe are now faster growth market for
communication
and technology.
Reality proved disappointing. A 2004 UN Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) report said: In the United States, e-commerce
between
enterprises (B2B), which in 2002 represented almost 93% of all
e-commerce,
accounted for 16.28% of all commercial transactions between
enterprises. While
overall transactions between enterprises (e-commerce and non
e-commerce) fell
in 2002, e-commerce B2B grew at an annual rate of 6.1%.
As for business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce,
UNCTAD reported that sales in the first quarter of 2004 amounted to 1.9
per
cent of total retail sales, a proportion that is nearly twice as large
as that
recorded in 2001. The annual rate of growth of retail e-commerce in the
US in
the year to the end of the first quarter of 2004 was 28.1%, while the
growth of
total retail in the same period was only 8.8%. Dow
Jones reported on May 20, 2005 that
first-quarter retail e-commerce sales in
the U.S. rose 23.8% compared with the year-ago period to $19.8 billion
from $16
billion, according to preliminary numbers released by the Department of
Commerce. E-commerce sales during the first quarter rose 6.4% from the
fourth
quarter, when they were $18.6 billion. Sales for all periods are on an
adjusted
basis, meaning the Commerce Department adjusts them for seasonal
variations and
holiday and trading-day differences but not for price changes.
E-commerce sales accounted for 2.2% of total retail sales in
the first quarter of 2005, when those sales were an estimated $916.9
billion,
according to the Commerce Department. Walmart, the low-priced retailer
that
imports outsourced goods from overseas, grew only 2%, indicating
spending
fatigue on the part of low-income US consumers, while Target Stores,
the
upscale retailer that also imports outsourced goods, continues to grow
at 7%,
indicating the effects of rising income disparity.
The CEA 2000 report did not address the question whether
e-commerce was merely a shift of commerce or a real growth. The possibility exists for the new technology
to generate negative growth. It happened
to IBM – the increased efficiency (lower unit cost of calculation
power) of IBM
big frames actually reduced overall IBM sales, and most of the profit
and
growth in personal computers went to Microsoft, the software company
that grew
on business that IBM, a self-professed hardware manufacturer, did not
consider
worthy of keeping for itself. The same thing happened to Intel where
Moore’s
Law declared in 1965 an exponential growth in the number of transistors
per
integrated circuit and predicted that this trend would continue the
doubling of
transistors every couple of years. But
what Moore’s Law did not predict was that this growth of computing
power per
dollar would cut into company profitability. As the market price of
computer
power continues to fall, the cost to producers to achieve Moore’s Law
has
followed the opposite trend: R&D, manufacturing, and test costs
have
increased steadily with each new generation of chips. As the fixed cost
of
semiconductor production continues to increase, manufacturers must sell
larger
and larger quantities of chips to remain profitable. In recent years,
analysts
have observed a decline in the number of “design starts” at advanced
process
nodes. While these observations were made in the period after the year
2000
economic downturn, the decline may be evidence that the long-term
global market
cannot economically sustain Moore’s Law. Is
the Google Bubble a replay of the AOL
fiasco?
Schumpeter’s creative destruction theory, while revitalizing
the macro-economy with technological obsolescence in the long run,
leaves real
corporate bodies in its path, not just obsolete theoretical concepts. Financial intermediaries and stock exchanges
face challenges from Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) which may
well
turn the likes of NYSE into sunset industries. ECNs
are electronic marketplaces which bring
buy/sell orders together
and match them in virtual space. Today, ECNs handle roughly 25% of the
volume
in NASDAQ stocks. The NYSE and the
Archipelago Exchange (ArcaEx) announced on April 20, 2005 that they
have
entered a definitive merger agreement that will lead to a combined
entity, NYSE
Group, Inc., becoming a publicly-held company. If approved by
regulators,
NYSE members and Archipelago shareholders, the merger will represent
the
largest-ever among securities exchanges and combine the world’s leading
equities
market with the most successful totally open, fully electronic
exchange.
Through Archipelago, the NYSE will compete for the first time in the
trading of
NASDAQ-listed stocks; it will be able to indirectly capture listings
business
that otherwise would not qualify to list on the NYSE. Archipelago lists
stocks
of companies that do not meet the NYSE’s listing standards.
On fiscal policy, US government spending, including social
programs and defense, declined as a share of the economy during the
eight years
of the Clinton watch. This in no small
way contributed to a polarization of both income and wealth, with
visible
distortions in both the demand and supply sides of the economy. This was the opposite of the FDR record of
increasing income and wealth equality by policy. The wealth effect tied
to
bloated equity and real estate markets could reverse suddenly and did
in 2000,
bailed out only by the Bush tax cut and the deficit spending on the War
on
Terrorism after 2001. Private debt kept
making all time highs throughout the 1990s and was celebrated by
neo-liberal
economists as a positive factor. Household
spending was heavily based on
expected rising future earnings
or paper profits, both of which might and did vanished on short notice. By election time in November 1999, the
Clinton economic miracle was fizzling. The
business cycle had not ended after all,
and certainly not by
self-aggrandizing government policies. It
merely got postponed for a more severe
crash later. The idea of ending the
business cycle in a
market economy was as much a fantasy as Vice President Cheney’s
assertion in a
speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars in August 26, 2002 that “the
Middle
East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the
streets
in Basra and Baghdad are sure to erupt in joy ….”
In their 1991 populist campaign for the White House, Bill
Clinton and Al Gore repeatedly pointed out the obscenity of the top 1%
of
Americans owning 40% of the country’s wealth. They also said that if
you
eliminated home ownership and only counted businesses, factories and
offices,
then the top 1% owned 90% of all commercial wealth. And the top 10%,
they said,
owned 99%. It was a situation they pledged to change if elected. But
once in
office, Clinton and Gore did nothing to redistribute wealth more
equally -
despite the fact that their two terms in office spanned the economic
joyride of
the 1990s that would eventually hurt the poor much more severely than
the rich.
On the contrary, economic inequality only continued to grow under the
Democrats. Reagan spread the national
debt equally among the people while Clinton gave all the wealth to the
rich.
Geopolitically, trade globalization was beginning to face
complex resistance worldwide by the second term of the Clinton
presidency. The momentum of resistance
after Clinton
would either slow further globalization or force the terms of trade to
be
revised. The Asian financial crises of 1997 revived economic
nationalism around
the world against US-led neo-liberal globalization, while the North
Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 revived
militarism in
the EU. Market fundamentalism as espoused by the US, far from being a
valid
science universally, was increasingly viewed by the rest of the world
as merely
US national ideology, unsupported even by US historical conditions.
Just as
anti-Napoleonic internationalism was essentially anti-French,
anti-globalization and anti-moral-imperialism are essentially anti-US.
US
unilateralism and exceptionism became the midwife for a new revival of
political and economic nationalism everywhere. The Bush Doctrine of
monopolistic nuclear posture, pre-emptive wars, “either with us or
against us”
extremism, and no compromise with states that allegedly support
terrorism, pours
gasoline on the smoldering fire of defensive nationalism everywhere.
Alan Greenspan in his October 29, 1997 Congressional
testimony on Turbulence in World
Financial Markets before the Joint Economic Committee said that “it
is
quite conceivable that a few years hence we will look back at this
episode
[Asian financial crisis of 1997]…. as a salutary event in terms of its
implications for the macro-economy.” When
one is focused only on the big picture,
details do not make much of
a difference: the earth always appears more or less round from space,
despite
that some people on it spend their whole lives starving and cities get
destroyed by war or natural disasters. That is the problem with
macroeconomics. As Greenspan spoke, many
around the world were waking up to the realization that the turbulence
in their
own financial markets was viewed by the US central banker as having a
“salutary
effect” on the US macro-economy. Greenspan
gave anti-US sentiments and monetary trade protectionism held by
participants
in these financial markets a solid basis and they were no longer
accused of
being mere paranoia.
Ironically, after the end of the Cold War, market capitalism
has emerged as the most fervent force for revolutionary change. Finance capitalism became inherently
democratic once the bulk of capital began to come from the pension
assets of
workers, despite widening income and wealth disparity. The monetary
value of US
pension funds is over $15 trillion, the bulk of which belong to average
workers. A new form of social capitalism has emerged which would gladly
eliminate the worker’s job in order to give him/her a higher return on
his/her
pension account. The capitalist in the individual is exploiting the
worker in
same individual. A conflict of interest arises between a worker’s
savings and
his/her earnings. As Pogo used to say: “The enemy: they are us.” This social capitalism, by favoring return on
capital over compensation for labor, produces overinvestment, resulting
in
overcapacity. But the problem of overcapacity can only be solved by
high income
consumers. Unemployment and underemployment in an economy of
overcapacity decrease
demand, leading to financial collapse. The world economy needs low
wages the
way the cattle business need foot and mouth disease.
The nomenclature of neo-classical economics reflects, and in
turn dictates, the warped logic of the economic system it produces.
Terms such
as money, capital, labor, debt, interest, profits, employment, market,
etc,
have been conceptualized to describe synthetic components of an
artificial
material system created by the power politics of greed. It is the
capitalist
greed in the worker that causes the loss of his/her job to lower wage
earners
overseas. The concept of the economic man who presumably always acts in
his
self-interest is a gross abstraction based on the flawed assumption of
market
participants acting with perfect and equal information and clear
understanding
of the implication of his actions. The pervasive use of these terms
over time
disguises the artificial system as the logical product of natural laws,
rather
than the conceptual components of the power politics of greed.
Just as monarchism first emerged as a progressive force
against feudalism by rationalizing itself as a natural law of politics
and
eventually brought about its own demise by betraying its progressive
mandate,
social capitalism today places return on capital above not only the
worker but
also the welfare of the owner of capital. The class struggle has been
internalized within each worker. As people facing the hard choice of
survival
in the present versus wellbeing in the future, they will always choose
survival, social capitalism will inevitably go the way of absolute
monarchism,
and make way for humanist socialism.
Next: Dollar hegemony
as monopolistic tariff |