The Coming Trade War
By
Henry C.K. Liu
Part I: Coming Trade War and Global Depression
Part II: Dollar
Hegemony Against Sovereign Credit
This article appeared in AToL
on June 24, 2005
Global trade has forced all countries to adopt market economy. Yet the market is not the economy. It is only
one aspect of the economy. A market economy can be viewed as an
aberration of
human civilization, as economist Karl Polanyi (1886-1964) pointed out.
The principal theme of Polanyi’s Origins of Our
Time: The Great Transformation (1945) was that market economy was
of very
recent origin and had emerged fully formed only as recently as the 19th
century, in conjunction with capitalistic industrialization. The
current
globalization of markets following the fall of the Soviet bloc is also
of
recent post-Cold War origin, in conjunction with the advent of the
electronic
information age and deregulated finance capitalism. A severe and
prolonged
depression can trigger the end of the market economy, when intelligent
human
beings are finally faced with the realization that the business cycle
inherent
in the market economy cannot be regulated sufficiently to prevent its
innate
destructiveness to human welfare and are forced to seek new economic
arrangements for human development. The
principle of diminishing returns will lead people to reject the market
economy,
however sophisticatedly regulated.
Prior to the coming of capitalistic industrialization, the market
played only a
minor part in the economic life of societies. Even where market places
could be
seen to be operating, they were peripheral to the main economic
organization
and activities of society. In many pre-industrial economies, markets
met only
twice a month. Polanyi argued that in modern market economies, the
needs of the
market determined social behavior, whereas in pre-industrial and
primitive
economies the needs of society determined market behavior. Polanyi
reintroduced
to economics the concepts of reciprocity and redistribution in human
interaction, which were the original aims of trade.
Reciprocity implies that people produce the goods and services they are
best at
and enjoy most in producing, and share them with others with joy. This
is
reciprocated by others who are good at and enjoy producing other goods
and
services. There is an unspoken agreement that all would produce that
which they
could do best and mutually share and share alike, not just sold to the
highest
bidder, or worse to produce what they despise to meet the demands of
the
market. The idea of sweatshops is totally unnatural to human dignity
and
uneconomic to human welfare. With reciprocity, there is no need for
layers of
management, because workers happily practice their livelihoods and need
no
coercive supervision. Labor is not forced and workers do not merely
sell their
time in jobs they hate, unrelated to their inner callings. Prices are
not fixed
but vary according to what different buyers with different
circumstances can
afford or what the seller needs in return from different buyers. The
law of one
price is inhumane, unnatural, inflexible and unfair. All workers find
their
separate personal fulfillment in different productive livelihoods of
their
choosing, without distortion by the need for money. The motivation to
produce
and share is not personal profit, but personal fulfillment, and
avoidance of
public contempt, communal ostracism, and loss of social prestige and
moral
standing.
This motivation, albeit distorted today by the dominance of
money, is still fundamental in societies operating under finance
capitalism. But in a money society, the
emphasis is on accumulating the most financial wealth, which is
accorded the
highest social prestige. The annual report on the world's richest 100
as
celebrities by Forbes is a clear evidence of this anomaly. The opinion
of
figures such as Bill Gates and Warren Buffet are regularly sought by
the media
on matters beyond finance, as if the possession of money itself
represents a
diploma of wisdom. In the 1960s, wealth
was an embarrassment among the flower children in the US. It was only
in the
1980s that the age of greed emerged to embrace commercialism. In a speech on June 3 at the Take Back
America conference in Washington, D.C, Bill Moyers drew attention to
the conclusion
by the editors of The Economist, all
friends of business and advocates of capitalism and free markets, that
“the
United States risks calcifying into a European-style class-based
society.” A front-page leader in the May
13, 2005 Wall
Street Journal concluded that “as the gap between rich and poor has
widened
since 1970, the odds that a child born in poverty will climb to wealth
- or
that a rich child will fall into middle class - remain stuck....Despite
the
widespread belief that the U.S. remains a more mobile society than
Europe,
economists and sociologists say that in recent decades the typical
child starting
out in poverty in continental Europe (or in Canada) has had a better
chance at
prosperity.” The New York Times
ran a 12-day series in June 2005 under the
heading of “Class Matters” which
observed that class is closely tied to money in the US and that “the movement of families up and down the
economic ladder is
the promise that lies at the heart of the American dream. But it does
not seem
to be happening quite as often as it used to.” The
myth that free markets spread equality
seems to be facing challenge
in the heart of market fundamentalism.
People trade to compensate for
deficiencies in their current state of
development. Free trade is not a license for exploitation. Exploitation
is
slavery, not trade. Imperialism is exploitation by systemic coercion on
an
international level. Neo-imperialism after the end of the Cold War
takes the
form of neo-liberal globalization of systemic coercion.
Free trade is hampered by systemic coercion.
Resistance
to systemic coercion is not to be confused with protectionism. To
participate
in free trade, a trader must have something with which to trade
voluntarily in
a market free of systemic coercion. All free trade participants need to
have
basic pricing power which requires that no one else commands
monopolistic pricing
power. That tradable something comes from development, which is a
process of
self-betterment. Just as equality before the law is a prerequisite for
justice,
equality in pricing power in the market is a prerequisite for free
trade. Traders
need basic pricing power for trade to be free. Workers
need pricing power for the value of
their labor to participate in free trade.
Yet trade in a market
economy by
definition is a game to
acquire overwhelming pricing power over one’s trading partners.
Wal-Mart for example
has enormous pricing power both as a bulk buyer and a mass retailer. But it uses its overwhelming pricing power
not to pay the highest wages to workers in factories and in its store,
but to
deliver the lowest price to its customers. The business model of
Wal-Mart,
whose sales volume is greater than the GDP and trade volume of many
small
countries, is anti-development. The
trade off between low income and low retail price follows a downward
spiral.
This downward spiral has been the main defect of trade de-regulation
when low
prices are achieved through the lowering of wages. The economic purpose
of
development is to raise income, not merely to lower wages to reduce
expenses by
lowering quality. International trade cannot be a substitute for
domestic development,
or even international development, although it can contribute to both
domestic
and international development if it is conducted on an equal basis for
the
mutual benefit of both trading partners. And the chief benefit is
higher income.
The terms of international trade needs to take into
consideration local conditions not as a reluctant tolerance but with
respect
for diversity. Former Japanese Vice
Finance Minister for International Affairs, Eisuke Sakakibara,
in a speech “The End of Market Fundamentalism” before the Foreign Correspondent's Club,
Tokyo, Jan. 22, 1999, presented a
coherent and wide ranging critique
of global macro orthodoxy. His view, that each national economic system
must
conform to agreed international trade rules and regulations but needs
not
assimilate the domestic rules and regulations of another country, is
heresy to US-led
one-size-fits-all globalization. In a computerized world where
output
standardization has become unnecessary, where the mass production of
customized
one-of-a-kind products is routine, one-size-fit all hegemony is nothing
more
than cultural imperialism. In a world of sovereign states, domestic
development
must take precedence over international trade, which is a system of
external
transactions made supposedly to augment domestic development. And
domestic
development means every nation is free to choose its own development
path most
appropriate to its historical conditions and is not required to adopt
the US
development model. But neo-liberal international trade since the end of
the
Cold War has increasingly preempted domestic development in both the
center and
the periphery of the world system. Quality
of life is regularly compromised in the name of efficiency.
This is the reason the French and the Dutch voted against
the EU constitution, as a resistance to the US model of globalization.
Britain
has suspended its own vote on the constitution to avoid a likely voter
rejection. In Italy, cabinet ministers
suggested abandoning the euro to return to an independent currency in
order to
regain monetary sovereignty. Bitter battles have erupted between member
nations
in the EU over national government budgets and subsidies. In that
sense,
neo-liberal trade is being increasingly identified as an obstacle, even
a threat,
to diversified domestic development and national culture.
Global trade has become a vehicle for
exploitation of the weak to strengthen the strong both domestically and
internationally. Culturally, US-style globalization is turning the
world into a
dull market for unhealthy MacDonald fast food, dreary Walt-Mart stores,
and
automated Coca Cola and ATM machines. Every airport around the world is
a
replica of a giant US department store with familiar brand names,
making it
hard to know which city one is in. Aside from being unjust and
culturally
destructive, neo-liberal global trade as it currently exists is
unsustainable,
because the perpetual transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich is
unsustainable anymore than drawing from a dry well is sustainable in a
drought,
nor can a stagnant consumer income sustain a consumer economy.
Neo-liberal
claims of fair benefits of free trade to the poor of the world, both in
the
center and the periphery, are simply not supported by facts.
Everywhere, people
who produce the goods cannot afford to buy the same goods for
themselves and
the profit is siphoned off to invisible investors continents away.
Trade
and Money
Trade is facilitated by money. Mainstream monetary economists view
government-issued money as a sovereign debt instrument with zero
maturity,
historically derived from the bill of exchange in free banking. This
view is
valid only for specie money, which is a debt certificate that entitles
the
holder to claim on demand a prescribed amount of gold or other specie
of value.
Government-issued fiat money, on the other hand, is not a sovereign
debt but a
sovereign credit instrument, backed by government acceptance of it for
payment
of taxes. This view of money is known as the State Theory of Money, or
Chartalism. The dollar, a fiat currency, entitles the holder to
exchange for
another dollar at any Federal Reserve Bank, no more, no less. Sovereign
government bonds are sovereign debts denominated in money. Sovereign
bonds
denominated in fiat money need never default since sovereign government
can
print fiat money at will. Local government bonds are not sovereign debt
and are
subject to default because local governments do not have the authority
to print
money. When fiat money buys bonds, the transaction represents credit
canceling
debt. The relationship is rather straightforward, but of fundamental
importance.
Credit drives the economy, not
debt. Debt is the mirror reflection of
credit. Even the most accurate mirror does violence to the symmetry of
its
reflection. Why does a mirror turn an image right to left and not
upside down
as the lens of a camera does? The scientific answer is that a mirror
image
transforms front to back rather than left to right as commonly assumed.
Yet we
often accept this aberrant mirror distortion as uncolored truth and we
unthinkingly consider the distorted reflection in the mirror as a
perfect
representation. Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the fairest of them
all? The answer is: your backside.
In the language of monetary economics, credit and debt are opposites
but not identical. In fact, credit and
debt operate in reverse
relations. Credit requires a positive net worth and debt does not. One
can have
good credit and no debt. High debt lowers credit rating. When one
understands
credit, one understands the main force behind the modern finance
economy, which
is driven by credit and stalled by debt. Behaviorally,
debt distorts marginal utility
calculations and rearranges
disposable income. Debt turns corporate shares into Giffen goods,
demand for
which increases when their prices go up, and creates what Federal
Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan calls "irrational exuberance", the economic
man gone mad.
<>If fiat money is not sovereign debt, then the
entire financial architecture of fiat
money capitalism is subject to reordering, just as physics was subject
to
reordering when man’s world view changed with the realization that the
earth is
not stationary nor is it the center of the universe. For one thing, the
need
for capital formation to finance socially useful development will be
exposed as
a cruel hoax. With sovereign credit, there is no need for capital
formation for
socially useful development in a sovereign nation. For another, savings
are not
necessary to finance domestic development, since savings are not
required for
the supply of sovereign credit. And since capital formation through
savings is
the key systemic rationale for income inequality, the proper use of
sovereign
credit will lead to economic democracy.
Sovereign Credit and Unemployment
In an economy financed by sovereign
credit, labor should be
in perpetual shortage, and the price of labor should constantly rise. A
vibrant
economy is one in which there is a persistent labor shortage and labor
enjoys basic,
though not monopolistic, pricing power. An economy should expand until
a labor
shortage emerges and keep expanding through productivity rise to
maintain a
slight labor shortage. Unemployment is an indisputable sign that the
economy is
underperforming and should be avoid as an economic plague.
The Phillips curve, formulated in 1958, describes the systemic
relationship between unemployment and wage-pushed inflation in the
business
cycle. It represented a milestone in the development of macroeconomics. British economist A. W.
H. Phillips observed that there was a consistent inverse relationship
between
the rate of wage inflation and the rate of unemployment in the United
Kingdom
from 1861 to 1957. Whenever unemployment
was low, inflation tended to be high. Whenever unemployment was high,
inflation
tended to be low. What Phillips did was to accept a defective labor
market in a
typical business cycle as natural law and to use the tautological data
of the
flawed regime to prove its validity, and made unemployment respectable
in
macroeconomic policymaking, in order to obscure the irrationality of
the
business cycle. That is like observing that the sick are found in
hospitals and
concluding that hospitals cause sickness and that a reduction in the
number of
hospitals will reduce the number of the sick. This theory will be
validated by
data if only hospital patients are counted as being sick and the sick
outside
of hospitals are viewed as “externalities” to the system.
This is precisely what has happened in the US
where an oversupply of hospital beds has resulted from changes in the
economics
of medical insurance, rather than a reduction of people needing
hospital
care. Part of the economic argument
against illegal immigration is based on the overload of non-paying
patients in
a health care system plagued with overcapacity.
Nevertheless, Nobel laureates Paul Samuelson and Robert
Solow led an army of government economists in the 1960s in using the
Phillips
curve as a guide for macro-policy trade-offs between inflation and
unemployment
in market economies. Later, Edmund
Phelps and Milton Friedman independently challenged the theoretical
underpinnings by pointing out separate effects between the “short-run”
and
“long-run” Phillips curves, arguing that the inflation-adjusted
purchasing
power of money wages, or real wages, would adjust to make the supply of
labor
equal to the demand for labor, and the unemployment rate would rest at
the real
wage level to moderate the business cycle. This level of unemployment
they
called the "natural rate" of unemployment. The definitions of the
natural rate of unemployment and its associated rate of inflation are
circularly self-validating. The natural rate of unemployment is that at
which
inflation is equal to its associated inflation. The associated rate of
inflation
rate is that which prevails when unemployment is equal to its natural
rate.
A monetary purist, Friedman correctly concluded that money
is all important, but as a social conservative, he left the path to
truth half
traveled, by not having much to say about the importance of the fair
distribution of money in the market economy, the flow of which is
largely
determined by the terms of trade. Contrary to the theoretical
relationship
described by Phillips curve, higher inflation was associated with
higher, not
lower, unemployment in the US in the 1970s and contrary to Friedman’s
claim,
deflation was associated also with high unemployment in Japan in the
1990s. The fact that both inflation and
deflation
accompanied high unemployment ought to discredit the Phillips curve and
Friedman’s notion of a natural unemployment rate. Yet most mainstream
economists
continue to accept a central tenet of the Friedman-Phelps analysis that
there
is some rate of unemployment that, if maintained, would be compatible
with a
constant rate of inflation. This they call the “non-accelerating
inflation rate
of unemployment” (NAIRU), which over the years has crept up from 4% to
6%.
NAIRU means that the price of sound money for the US is 6%
unemployment. The US Labor Department reported the “good news” that in
May
2005, 7.6 million persons, or 5.1% of the workforce,
were
unemployed in the US, well within NAIRU range. Since
the low income tend to have more
children than the national norm,
that translates to households with more than 20 million children with
unemployed parents. On the shoulders of these unfortunate, innocent
souls rests
the systemic cost of sound money, defined as having a non-accelerating
inflation rate, paying for highly irresponsible government fiscal
policies of
deficits and a flawed monetary policy that leads to sky-rocketing trade
deficits and debts. That is equivalent to saying that if 6% of the
world
population dies from starvation, the price of food can be stabilized.
And
unfortunately, such is the terms of global agricultural trade. No
government
economist has bothered to find out what would be the natural inflation
rate for
real full employment.
It is hard to see how sound money can ever lead to full
employment when unemployment is necessary to keep money sound. Within
limits
and within reason, unemployment hurts people and inflation hurts money.
And if
money exists to serve people, then the choice between inflation and
unemployment becomes obvious. The theory of comparative advantage in
world trade
is merely Say’s Law internationalized. It requires full employment to
be
operative.
Wages and Profit
And neoclassical economics does not allow the
prospect of
employers having an objective of raising wages, as Henry Ford did,
instead of
minimizing wages as current corporate management, such as General
Motors,
routinely practices. Henry Ford raised
wages to increase profits by selling more cars to workers, while Ford
Motors
today cuts wages to maximize profit while adding to overcapacity.
Therein resides
the cancer of market capitalism: falling wages will lead to the
collapse of an
overcapacity economy. This is why global wage arbitrage is economically
destructive unless and until it is structured to raise wages everywhere
rather
than to keep prices low in the developed economies.
That is done by not chasing after the lowest
price made possible by the lowest wages, but by chasing after a bigger
market
made possible by rising wages. The terms
of global trade need to be restructured to reward companies that aim at
raising
wages and benefits globally through internationally coordinated
transitional
government subsidies, rather than the regressive approach of protective
tariffs
to cut off trade that exploits wage arbitrage. This will enable the
low-wage
economies to begin to be able to afford the products they produce and
to import
more products from the high wage economies to move towards balanced
trade.
Eventually, certainly within a decade, wage arbitrage would cease to be
the
driving force in global trade as wage levels around the world equalize. When the population of the developing
economies achieves per capita income that matches that in developed
economies,
the world economy will be rid of the modern curse of overcapacity
caused by the
flawed neoclassical economics of scarcity. When top executives are paid
tens of
million of dollars in bonuses to cut wages and worker benefits, it is
not fair
reward for good management; it is legalized theft.
Executives should only receive bonuses if
both profit and wages in their companies rise as a result of their
management
strategies.
Sovereign Credit and
Dollar Hegemony
In an economy that can operate on
sovereign credit, free
from dollar hegemony, private savings are needed only for private
investment
that has no clear socially redeeming purpose or value. Savings are
deflationary
without full employment, as savings reduces current consumption to
provide
investment to increase future supply. Savings for capital formation
serve only
the purpose of bridging the gap between new investment and new revenue
from
rising productivity and increased capacity from the new investment. With sovereign credit, private savings are
not needed for this bridge financing. Private
savings are also not needed for rainy
days or future retirement
in an economy that has freed itself from the tyranny of the business
cycle
through planning. Say’s Law of supply creating its own demand is a very
special
situation that is operative only under full employment, as eminent
post-Keynesian economist Paul Davidson has pointed out. Say’s Law
ignores a
critical time lag between supply and demand that can be fatal to a
fast-moving
modern economy without demand management. Savings require interest
payments,
the compounding of which will regressively make any financial system
unsustainable by tilting it toward overcapacity caused by
overinvestment. The
religions forbade usury also for very practical reasons.
Yet interest on money is the very foundation
of finance capitalism, held up by the neoclassical economic notion that
money
is more valuable when it is scarce. Aggregate poverty then is necessary
for
sound money. This was what President
Reagan meant when he said that there is always going to be poor people.
The Bank of International Finance (BIS) estimated
that as of
the end of 2004, the notional value of global OTC interest rate
derivatives is
around $185 trillion, with a market risk exposure of over $5 trillion,
which is
almost half of US 2004 GDP. Interest
rate derivatives are by far the largest category of structured finance
contracts, taking up $185 trillion of the total $250 trillion of
notional
values. The $185 trillion notional value of interest rate derivatives
is 41
times the outstanding value of US Treasury bonds. This means that
interest rate
volatility will have a disproportioned impact of the global financial
system in
ways that historical data cannot project.
Fiat money issued by government is now legal tender in all
modern national
economies since the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed
exchange
rates linked to a gold-backed dollar. The State Theory of Money
(Chartalism)
holds that the general acceptance of government-issued fiat currency
rests
fundamentally on government’s authority to tax. Government’s
willingness to
accept the currency it issues for payment of taxes gives the issuance
currency
within a national economy. That currency is sovereign credit for tax
liabilities, which are dischargeable by credit instruments issued by
government, known as fiat money. When issuing fiat money, the
government owes
no one anything except to make good a promise to accept its money for
tax
payment.
A central banking regime operates on the notion of
government-issued fiat money as sovereign credit. That is the essential
difference between central banking with government-issued fiat money,
which is
a sovereign credit instrument, and free banking with privately issued
specie
money, which is a bank IOU that allows the holder to claim the gold
behind it.
With the fall of the USSR, US attitude toward the
rest of
the world changed. It no longer needs to
compete for the hearts and minds of the masses of the Third /Fourth
Worlds. So
trade has replaced aid. The US has embarked on a strategy to use
Third/Fourth-World cheap labor and non-existent environmental
regulation to
compete with its former Cold War Allies, now industrialized rivals in
trade, taking
advantage of traditional US anti-labor ideology to outsource low-pay
jobs,
playing against the strong pro-labor tradition of social welfare in
Europe and
Japan. In the meantime, the US pushed
for global financial deregulation based on dollar hegemony and emerged
as a
500-lb gorilla in the globalized financial market that left the
Japanese and
Europeans in the dust, playing catch up in an un-winnable game. In the
game of
finance capitalism, those with capital in the form of fiat money they
can print
freely will win hands down.
The tool of this US strategy is the privileged role
of the
dollar as the key reserve currency for world trade, otherwise known as
dollar
hegemony. Out of this emerges an international financial architecture
that does
real damage to the actual producer economies for the benefit of the
financier
economies. The dollar, instead of being a
neutral agent of exchange, has become a weapon of massive economic
destruction (WMED)
more lethal than nuclear bombs and with more blackmail power, which is
exercised ruthlessly by the IMF on behalf of the Washington Consensus.
Trade
wars are fought through volatile currency valuations. Dollar hegemony
enables
the US to use its trade deficits as the bait for its capital account
surplus.
Foreign direct investment
(FDI) under dollar hegemony has
changed the face of the international economy. Since the early 1970s,
FDI has
grown along with global merchandise trade and is the single most
important
source of capital for developing countries, not net savings or
sovereign
credit. FDI is mostly denominated in dollars, a fiat currency that the
US can
produce at will since 1971, or in dollar derivatives such as the yen or
the
euro, which are not really independent currencies.
Thus FDI is by necessity concentrated in
exports related development, mainly destined for US markets or markets
that
also sell to US markets for dollars with which to provide the return on
dollar-denominated
FDI. US economic policy is shifting from trade promotion to FDI
promotion. The
US trade deficit is financed by the US capital account surplus which in
turn
provides the dollars for FDI in the exporting economies. A trade spat
with the
EU over beef and bananas, for example, risks large US investment stakes
in
Europe. And the suggestion to devalue
the dollar to promote US exports is misleading for it would only make
it more
expensive for US affiliates to do business abroad while making it
cheaper for
foreign companies to buy dollar assets. An attempt to improve the trade
balance, then, would actually end up hurting the FDI balance. This is the rationale behind the slogan: a
strong dollar is in the US national interest.
Between 1996 and 2003, the monetary value of US
equities
rose around 80% compared with 60% for European and a decline of 30% for
Japanese. The 1997 Asian financial
crisis cut Asia equities values by more than half, some as much as 80%
in
dollar terms even after drastic devaluation of local currencies. Even though the US has been a net debtor
since 1986, its net income on the international investment position has
remained positive, as the rate of return on US investments abroad
continues to
exceed that on foreign investments in the US. This
reflects the overall strength of the US
economy, and that strength
is derived from the US being the only nation that can enjoy the
benefits of
sovereign credit utilization while amassing external debt, largely due
to dollar
hegemony.
In the US, and now also increasingly so in Europe
and Asia,
capital markets are rapidly displacing banks as both savings venues and
sources
of funds for corporate finance. This shift, along with the growing
global integration
of financial markets, is supposed to create promising new opportunities
for
investors around the globe. Neo-liberals even claim that these changes
could
help head off the looming pension crises facing many nations. But so
far it has
only created sudden and recurring financial crises like those that
started in
Mexico in 1982, then in the UK in 1992, again in Mexico in 1994, in
Asia in
1997, and Russia, Brazil, Argentina and Turkey subsequently.
The introduction of the euro has accelerated the
growth of
the EU financial markets. For the current 25 members of the European
Union, the
common currency nullified national requirements for pension and
insurance
assets to be invested in the same currencies as their local
liabilities, a
restriction that had long locked the bulk of Europe’s long-term savings
into
domestic assets. Freed from foreign-exchange transaction costs and
risks of
currency fluctuations, these savings fueled the rise of larger, more
liquid
European stock and bond markets, including the recent emergence of a
substantial
euro junk bond market. These more dynamic capital markets, in turn,
have placed
increased competitive pressure on banks by giving corporations new
financing
options and thus lowering the cost of capital within euroland. How this
will
interact with the euro-dollar market is still indeterminate. Euro-dollars are dollars outside of US
borders everywhere and not necessarily Europe, generally pre-taxed and
subject
to US taxes if they return to US soil or accounts. The term also
applies to
euro-yens and euro-euros. But the idea of French retirement accounts
investing
in non-French assets is both distasteful and irrational for the average
French
worker, particularly if such investment leads to decreased job security
in
France and jeopardizes the jealously guarded 35-hour work-week with 30
days of
paid annual vacation which has been part of French life.
Take the Japanese economy as an example, the world’s
largest
creditor economy. It holds over $800 billion in dollar reserves in
2005. The
Bank of Japan (BoJ), the central bank, has bought over 300 billion
dollars with
yen from currency markets in the last two years in an effort to
stabilize the exchange
value of the yen, which continued to appreciate against the dollar.
Now, BoJ is
faced with a dilemma: continue buying dollars in a futile effort to
keep the
yen from rising, or sell dollars to try to recoup yen losses on its
dollar reserves.
Japan has officially pledged not to diversify its dollar reserves into
other
currencies, so as not to roil currency markets, but many hedge funds
expect
Japan to soon run out of options.
Now if the BoJ sells dollars at the rate of $4
billion a
day, it will take some 200 trading days to get out of its dollar
reserves.
After the initial 2 days of sale, the remaining unsold $792 billion
reserves
would have a market value of 20% less than before the sales program
began. So the
BoJ will suffer a substantial net yen paper loss of $160 billion. If
the BoJ
continues its sell-dollar program, everyday Y400 billion will leave the
yen money
supply to return to the BoJ if it sells dollars for yen, or the
equivalent in
euro if it sells dollars for euro. This will push the dollar further
down
against the yen or euro, in which case the value of its remaining
dollar reserves
will fall even further, not to mention a sharp contraction in the yen
money
supply which will push the Japanese economy into a deeper recession.
If the BoJ sells dollars for gold, two things may
happen.
There would be not enough sellers because no one has enough gold to
sell to
absorb the dollars at current gold prices. Instead, while price of gold
will
rise, the gold market may simply freezes with no transactions. Gold
holders
will not have to sell their gold; they can profit from gold derivatives
on
notional values. Also, the reverse market effect that faces the dollar
would
hit gold. After two days of Japanese
gold buying, everyone would hold on to their gold in anticipation for
still
higher gold prices. There would be no
market makers. Part of the reason central banks have been leasing out
their
gold in recent years is to provide liquidity to the gold market. The second thing that may happen is that
price of gold will sky rocket in currency terms, causing a great
deflation in
gold terms. The US national debt as of June 1, 2005 was $7.787
trillion. US
government gold holding is about 261,000,000 ounces. Price of gold
required to
pay back the national debt with US-held gold is $29,835 per ounce. At
that
price, an ounce of gold will buy a car. Meanwhile, market price of gold
as of
June 4, 2005 was $423.50 per ounce. Gold peaked at $850 per ounce in
1980 and
bottom at $252 in 1999 when oil was below $10 a barrel. At $30,000 per
ounce, governments
then will have to made gold trading illegal, as FDR did in 1930 and we
are back
to square one. It is much easier for a government to outlaw the trading
of gold
within its borders than it is for it to outlaw the trading of its
currency in
world markets. It does not take much to
conclude that anyone who advices any strategy of long-term holding of
gold will
not get to the top of the class.
Heavily indebted poor countries need debt relief to
get out
of virtual financial slavery. Some African governments spend three
times as
much on debt service as they do on health care. Britain has proposed a
half
measure that would have the IMF sell about $12 billion worth of its
gold
reserves, which have a total current market value of about $43 billion
to
finance debt relief. The US has veto power over gold decisions in the
IMF. Thus Congress holds the key. However, the mining industry lobby has
blocked a vote. In January, a letter opposing the sale of IMF gold was
signed
by 12 US senators from Western mining states, arguing that the sale
could drive
down the price of gold. A similar letter was signed in March by 30
members of
the House of Representatives. Lobbyists from the National Mining
Association
and gold mining companies, such as Newmont Mining and Barrick Gold
Corp,
persuaded the Congressional leadership that the gold proposal would not
pass in
Congress, even before it came up for debate. The BIS reports that gold
derivatives took up 26% of the world’s commodity derivatives market yet
gold
only composes 1% of the world's annual commodity production value, with
26
times more derivatives structured against gold than against other
commodities,
including oil. The Bush administration, at first apparently unwilling
to take
on a congressional fight, began in April to oppose gold sales outright. But President Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony
Blair announced on June 7 that the US and UK are “well on their way” to
a deal
which would provide 100% debt cancellation for some
poor nations to the World Bank and
African Development Fund as a
sign of progress in the G-8 debate over debt cancellation.
Jude Wanniski, a former editor of the Wall Street
Journal, commenting in
his Memo on the Margin on the Internet on June 15, 2005, on the
headline of Pat
Buchanan’s syndicated column of the same date: Reviving the Foreign-Aid
Racket,
wrote: “This not a bailout of Africa’s poor or Latin American peasants.
This is
a bailout of the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank…. The second part of the racket is that in
exchange for getting debt relief, the poor countries will have to spend
the
money they save on debt service on "infrastructure projects," to
directly help their poor people with water and sewer line, etc., which
will be
constructed by contractors from the wealthiest nations…
What comes next? One of the worst economists
in the world, Jeffrey Sachs, is in charge of the United Nations scheme
to raise
mega-billions from western taxpayers for the second leg of this scheme.
He
wants $25 billion A YEAR for the indefinite future, as I recall, and he
has the
fervent backing of The New York Times, which always weeps
crocodile
tears for the racketeers. It was Jeffrey Sachs, in case you forgot,
who, with
the backing of the NYTimes persuaded Moscow under Mikhail
Gorbachev to
engage in "shock therapy" to convert from communism to capitalism. It
produced the worst inflation in the history of Russia, caused the
collapse of
the Soviet federation, and sank the Russian people into a poverty they
had
never experienced under communism.”
The dollar cannot go up or down more than 20%
against any other major currencies
within a short time without causing a major global financial crisis.
Yet,
against the US equity markets the dollar appreciated about 40% in
purchasing
power in the 2000-02 market crash, so had gold. And
against real estate prices between 2002
and 2005, the dollar has
depreciated 60% or more. According to Greenspan’s figures, the Fed can
print $8
trillion more fiat dollars without causing inflation. The problem is
not the money
printing. The problem is where that $8 trillion is injected. If it is
injected
into the banking system, then the Fed will have to print $3 trillion
every
subsequent year just to keep running in place. If the $8 trillion is
injected
into the real economy in the form of full employment and higher wages,
the US
will have a very good economy, and much less need for paranoia against
Asia or
the EU. But US wages cannot rise as long as global wage arbitrage is
operative. This is one of the arguments
behind protectionism. It led Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to say on May 5 he feared what appeared
to be a
growing move toward trade protectionism, saying it could lessen the US
and the
world's economy ability to withstand shock. Yet
if democracy works in the US,
protectionism will be unstoppable as
long as free trade benefits the elite at the expense of the voting
masses.
Fiat Money is Sovereign Credit
Money is like power: use it or lose it. Money unused
(not circulated) is
defunct wealth. Fiat money not circulated is not wealth but
merely pieces
of printed paper sitting in a safe. Gold unused as money is merely a
shiny
metal good only as ornamental gifts for weddings and birthdays.
The
usefulness of money to the economy is dependent on its circulation,
like the
circulation of blood to bring oxygen and nutrient to the living
organism. The
rate of money circulation is called velocity by monetary economists. A
vibrant
economy requires a high velocity of money. Money,
like most representational instruments,
is subject to declaratory
definition. In semantics, a declaratory statement is self validating.
For
example: “I am King” is a statement that makes the declarer king,
albeit in a
kingdom of one citizen. What gives weight to the declaration is the
number of
others accepting that declaration. When sufficient people within a
jurisdiction
accept the kingship declaration, the declarer becomes king of that
jurisdiction
instead of just his own house. When an issuer of money declares it to
be credit
it will be credit, or when he declares it to be debt it will be debt.
But the social
validity of the declaration depends on the acceptance of others.
Anyone can issue money, but only sovereign government can issue
legal tender
for all debts, public and private, universally accepted with the force
of law
within the sovereign domain. The issuer of private money must back that
money
with some substance of value, such as gold, or the commitment for
future
service, etc. Others who accept that money have provided something of
value for
that money, and have received that money instead of something of
similar value
in return. So the issuer of that money has given an instrument of
credit to the
holder in the form of that money, redeemable with something of value on
a later
date.
When the state issues fiat money under the principle of Chartalism, the
something
of value behind it is the fulfillment of tax obligations. Thus the
state issues
a credit instrument, called (fiat) money, good for the cancellation of
tax
liabilities. By issuing fiat money, the state is not borrowing from
anyone. It
is issuing tax credit to the economy.
Even if money is declared as debt assumed by an issuer who is not a
sovereign
who has the power to tax, anyone accepting that money expects to
collect what
is owed him as a creditor. When that money is used in a subsequent
transaction,
the spender is parting with his creditor right to buy something of
similar
value from a third party, thus passing the “debt” of the issuer to the
third
party. Thus no matter what money is declared to be, its functions is a
credit
instrument in transactions. When one gives money to another, the giver
is
giving credit and the receiver is incurring a debt unless value is
received
immediately for that money. When debt is repaid with money, money acts
as a
credit instrument. When government buys back government bonds, which is
sovereign
debt, it cannot do so with fiat money it issues unless fiat money is
sovereign credit.
When money changes hands, there is
always a creditor and a debtor. Otherwise
there is no need for money, which stands for value rather than being
value intrinsically.
When a cow is exchanged for another cow, that is bartering, but when a
cow is
bought with money, the buyer parts with money (an instrument of value)
while
the seller parts with the cow (the substance of value). The seller puts
himself
in the position of being a new creditor for receiving the money in
exchange for
his cow. The buyer exchanges his creditor position for possession of
the cow.
In this transaction, money is an instrument of credit, not a debt.
When private money is issued, the only way it will be accepted
generally is
that the money is redeemable for the substance of value behind it based
on the
strong credit of the issuer. The issuer of private money is a custodian
of the
substance of value, not a debtor. All that is logic, and it does not
matter how
many mainstream monetary economists say money is debt.
Economist Hyman P Minsky (1919-1996) observed correctly that money is
created
whenever credit is issued. He did not say money is created when debt is
incurred. Only entities with good credit can issue credit or create
money.
Debtors cannot create money, or they would not have to borrow. However,
a
creditor can only be created by the existence of a debtor. So both a
creditor
and a debtor are needed to create money. But only the creditor can
issue money,
the debtor accepts the money so created which puts him in debt.
The difference with the state is that its power to levy taxes exempts
it from
having to back its creation of fiat money with any other assets of
value. The state
when issuing fiat money is acting as a sovereign creditor. Those who
took the fiat
money without exchanging it with things of value is indebted to the
state; and
because taxes are not always based only on income, a tax payer is a
recurring debtor
to the state by virtue of his citizenship, even those with no income.
When the
state provides transfer payments in the form of fiat money, it relieves
the
recipient of his tax liabilities or transfers the exemption from others
to the
recipient to put the recipient in a position of a creditor to the
economy
through the possession of fiat money. The holder of fiat money is then
entitled
to claim goods and services from the economy. For
things that are not for sale, such as
political office, money is
useless, at least in theory. The exercise of the fiat money’s claim on
goods
and services is known as buying something that is for sa<>le.
There is a difference between buying a cow with fiat money
and buying a cow with private IOUs (notes). The transaction with fiat
money is
complete. There is no further obligation on either side after the
transaction.
With notes, the buyer must either eventually pay with money, which
cancels the
notes (debt) or return the cow. The correct way to look at sovereign
government-issued fiat money is that it is not a sovereign debt, but a
sovereign
credit good for canceling tax obligations. When the government redeems
sovereign
bonds (debt) with fiat money (sovereign credit), it is not paying off
old debt
with new debt, which would be a Ponzi scheme.
Government
does not become a debtor by issuing fiat money,
which in the US is a Federal Reserve note, not an ordinary bank note.
The word
“bank” does not appear on US dollars. Zero maturity
money (ZMM), which grew from $550 billion in 1971 when Nixon took the
dollar
off gold, to $6.63 trillion as of May 30, 2005 is not a Federal debt.
It is a
Federal credit to the economy acceptable for payment of taxes and as
legal
tender for all debts, public and private. Anyone refusing to accept
dollars within
US jurisdiction is in violation of US law. One is free to set market
prices
that determine the value, or purchasing power of the dollar, but it is
illegal
on US soil to refuse to accept dollars for the settlement of debts. Instruments used for settling debts are
credit instruments. When fiat money is used to buy sovereign bonds
(debt), money
cannot be anything but an instrument of sovereign credit. If fiat money
is
sovereign debt, there is no need to sell government bonds for fiat
money. When a sovereign government sells a
sovereign
bond for fiat money issues, it is withdrawing sovereign credit from the
economy. And if the government then spends the money, the money supply
remains
unchanged. But if the government allows
a fiscal surplus by spending less than its tax revenue, the money
supply
shrinks and the economy slows. That was the effect of the Clinton
surplus which
produce the recession of 2000. While
run-away fiscal deficits are inflationary, fiscal surpluses lead to
recessions.
Conservatives who are fixated on fiscal surpluses are simply uninformed
on
monetary economics.<>
For euro-dollars, meaning fiat dollars outside of the US,
the reason those who are not required to pay US taxes accept them is
because of
dollar hegemony, not because dollars are IOUs of the US government.
Everyone
accept dollars because dollars can buy oil and all other key
commodities. When
the Fed injects money into the US banking system, it is not issuing
government
debt; it is expanding sovereign credit which would require higher
government
tax revenue to redeem. But if expanding sovereign credit expands the
economy,
tax revenue will increase without changing the tax rate. Dollar
hegemony exempts
the dollar, and only the dollar, from foreign exchange implication on
the State
Theory of Money. To issue sovereign debt, the Treasury issues treasury
bonds.
Thus under dollar hegemony, the US is the only nation that can practice
and
benefit from sovereign credit under the principle of Chartalism.
<>
Money and bonds are opposite instruments that cancel each
other. That is how the Fed Open Market Committee (FOMC) controls the
money
supply, by buying or selling government securities with fiat dollars to
set a
fed funds rate target. The fed funds rate is the interest rate at which
banks
lend to each other overnight. As such, it is a market interest rate
that influences
market interest rates throughout the world in all currencies through
exchange
rates. Holders of a government bond can
claim its face value in fiat money at maturity, but holder of a fiat
dollar can
only claim a fiat dollar replacement at the Fed. Holders of fiat
dollars can
buy new sovereign bonds at the Treasury, or outstanding sovereign bond
in the
bond market, but not at the Fed. The Fed does not issue debts, only
credit in the
form of fiat money. When the Fed FOMC buys or sells government
securities, it
does on behalf of the Treasury. When the Fed increases the money
supply, it is
not adding to the national debt. It is increasing sovereign credit in
the
economy. That is why monetary easing is not deficit financing.
Money and Inflation
It is sometimes said that war’s legitimate child is
revolution and war’s bastard child is inflation. World War I was no
exception.
The US national debt multiplied 27 times to finance the nation’s
participation
in that war, from US$1 billion to $27 billion. Far from ruining the
United
States, the war catapulted the country into the front ranks of the
world’s
leading economic and financial powers. The national debt turned out to
be a
blessing, for government securities are indispensable as anchors for a
vibrant
credit market.<>
Inflation was a different story. By the end of World War I,
in 1919, US prices were rising at the rate of 15% annually, but the
economy
roared ahead. In response, the Federal Reserve Board raised the
discount rate
in quick succession, from 4 to 7%, and kept it there for 18 months to
try to
rein in inflation. The discount rate is the interest rate charged to
commercial
banks and other depository institutions on loans they receive from
their
regional Federal Reserve Bank’s lending facility--the discount window.
The
result was that in 1921, 506 banks failed. Deflation descended on the
economy
like a perfect storm, with commodity prices falling 50% from their 1920
peak,
throwing farmers into mass bankruptcies. Business activity fell by
one-third;
manufacturing output fell by 42%; unemployment rose fivefold to 11.9%,
adding 4
million to the jobless count. The economy came to a screeching halt.
From the
Fed’s perspective, declining prices were the goal, not the problem;
unemployment was necessary to restore US industry to a sound footing,
freeing
it from wage-pushed inflation. Potent medicine always came with a
bitter taste,
the central bankers explained.
At this point, a technical process inadvertently gave the New York
Federal
Reserve Bank, which was closely allied with internationalist banking
interest,
preeminent influence over the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, the
composition of which represented a more balanced national interest. The
initial
operation of the Fed did not use the open-market operation of
purchasing or
selling government securities to set interest rate policy as a method
of
managing the money supply. The Fed could not simply print money to buy
government
securities to inject money into the money supply because the dollar was
based
on gold and the amount of gold held by the government was relatively
fixed. Money
in the banking system was created entirely through the discount window
at the
regional Federal Reserve Banks. Instead of buying or selling government
bonds,
the regional Feds accepted "real bills" of trade, which when paid off
would extinguish money in the banking system, making the money supply
self-regulating in accordance with the "real bills" doctrine to
maintain the gold standard. The regional Feds bought government
securities not
to adjust money supply, but to enhance their separate operating profit
by
parking idle funds in interest-bearing yet super-safe government
securities,
the way institutional money managers do today.
Bank economists at that time did not understand that when the regional
Feds
independently bought government securities, the aggregate effect would
result
in macro-economic implications of injecting "high power" money into
the banking system, with which commercial banks could create more money
in
multiple by lending recycles based on the partial reserve principle.
When the
government sold bonds, the reverse would happen. When the Fed made open
market
transactions, interest rates would rise or fall accordingly in
financial
markets. And when the regional Feds did not act in unison, the credit
market
could become confused or become disaggregated, as one regional Fed
might buy
while another might sell government securities in its open market
operations.
Benjamin Strong, first president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank,
saw the
problem and persuaded the other 11 regional Feds to let the New York
Fed handle
all their transactions in a coordinated manner. The regional Feds
formed an
Open Market Investment Committee, to be run by the New York Fed for the
purpose
of maximizing overall profit for the whole system. This committee
became
dominated by the New York Fed, which was closely linked to big-money
center
bank interests which in turn were closely tied to international
financial
markets. The Federal Reserve Board approved the arrangement without
full
understanding of its full implication: that the Fed was falling under
the undue
influence of the New York internationalist bankers. For the US, this
was the
beginning of financial globalization. This fatal flaw would reveal
itself in
the Fed's role in causing and its impotence in dealing with the 1929
crash.
The deep 1920-21 depression eventually recovered by the lowering of the
Fed
discount rate into the Roaring Twenties, which, like the New Economy
bubble of
the 1990s, left some segments of economy and the population in them
lingering
in a depressed state. Farmers remained victimized by depressed
commodity prices
and factory workers shared in the prosperity only by working longer
hours and
assuming debt with the easy money that the banks provided. Unions lost
30% of
their membership because of high unemployment in boom time. The
prosperity was
entirely fueled by the wealth effect of a speculative boom in the stock
market
that by the end of the decade would face the 1929 crash and land the
nation and
the world in the Great Depression. Historical data showed that when New
York
Fed president Strong leaned on the regional Feds to ease the discount
rate on
an already overheated economy in 1927, the Fed lost its last window of
opportunity to prevent the 1929 crash. Some historians claimed that
Strong did
so to fulfill his internationalist vision at the risk of endangering
the
national interest. It is an issue of
debate that continues in Congress today. Like Greenspan, Strong argued
that it
was preferable to deal with post-crash crisis management by adding
liquidity
than to pop a bubble prematurely with preventive measures of tight
money. It is
a strategy that requires letting a bubble to pop only inside a bigger
bubble.
The speculative boom of easy credit in the 1920s attracted many to buy
stocks
with borrowed money and used the rising price of stocks as new
collateral for borrowing
more to buy more stocks. Broker’s loans went from under $5 million in
mid 1928
to $850 million in September of 1929. The market capitalization of the
846
listed companies of the New York Stock Exchange was $89.7 billion, at
1.24
times 1929 GDP. By current standards, a case could be built that stocks
in 1929
were in fact technically undervalued. The 2,750 companies listed in the
New
York Stock Exchange had total global market capitalization exceeding
$18
trillion in 2004, 1.53 times 2004 GDP of $11.75 trillion.<>
On January 14, 2001, the DJIA reached its all time high to
date at 11,723, not withstanding Greenspan’s warning of “irrational
exuberance”
on December 6, 1996 when the DJIA was at 6,381. From
its August 12, 1982 low of 777, the DJIA
began its most spectacular
bull market in history. It was interrupted briefly only by the
abrupt and
frightening crash on October 19, 1987 when the DJIA lost 22.6% on Black
Monday,
falling to 1,739. It represented a
1,020-point
drop from its previous peak of 2,760 reached less than two months
earlier on
August 21. But Greenspan’s easy money
policy lifted the DJIA to 11,723 in 13 years, a 674% increase. In 1929
the top
came on September 4, with the DJIA at 386. A headline
in The New York Times on
October 22,
1929, reported highly-respected economist Irving Fisher as saying:
“Prices of
Stocks Are Low.” Two days later, the stock market crashed, and by the
end of
November, the New York Stock Exchange shares index was down 30%. The
index
did not return to the 9/3/29 level until November, 1954. At its worst
level,
the index dropped to 40.56 in July 1932, a drop of 89%. Fisher
had based his statement on strong earnings reports, few
industrial disputes, and evidence of high investment in research and
development (R&D) and in other intangible capital. Theory and
supportive
data not withstanding, the reality was that the stock market
boom was
based on borrowed money and false optimism. In
hindsight, many economists have since
concluded that stock prices
were overvalued by 30% in 1929. But when
the crash came, the overshoot dropped the index by 89% in less than
three
years<>.
Money and Gold
When money is not backed by gold, its exchange value must be
managed by government, more specifically by the monetary policies of
the
central bank. No responsible government will voluntarily let the market
set the
exchange value of its currency, market fundamentalism notwithstanding.
Yet
central bankers tend to be attracted to the gold standard because it
can
relieve them of the unpleasant and thankless responsibility of
unpopular
monetary policies to sustain the value of money. Central bankers have
been
caricatured as party spoilers who take away the punch bowl just when
the party
gets going.
Yet even a gold standard is based on a fixed value of money to gold,
set by
someone to reflect the underlying economical conditions at the time of
its
setting. Therein lies the inescapable need for human judgment. Instead
of
focusing on the appropriateness of the level of money valuation under
changing
economic conditions, central banks often become fixated on merely
maintaining a
previously set exchange rate between money and gold, doing serious
damage in
the process to any economy temporarily out of sync with that fixed
rate. It
seldom occurs to central bankers that the fixed rate was the problem,
not the dynamic
economy. When the exchange value of a currency falls, central bankers
often
feel a personal sense of failure, while they merely shrug their
shoulders to
refer to natural laws of finance when the economy collapses from an
overvalued
currency.
The return to the gold standard in war-torn Europe in the 1920s was
engineered
by a coalition of internationalist central bankers on both sides of the
Atlantic as a prerequisite for postwar economic reconstruction. Lenders
wanted
to make sure that their loans would be repaid in money equally valuable
as the
money they lent out, pretty much the way the IMF deals with the debt
problem
today. President Strong of the New York
Fed and his former partners at the House of Morgan were closely
associated with
the Bank of England, the Banque de France, the Reichsbank, and the
central
banks of Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium, as well as with
leading
internationalist private bankers in those countries. Montagu Norman,
governor
of the Bank of England from 1920-44, enjoyed a long and close personal
friendship with Strong as well as ideological alliance. Their joint
commitment
to restore the gold standard in Europe and so to bring about a return
to the “international
financial normalcy” of the prewar years was well documented. Norman
recognized
that the impairment of British financial hegemony meant that, to
accomplish
postwar economic reconstruction that would preserve pre-war British
interests,
Europe would “need the active cooperation of our friends in the United
States.”
Like other New York bankers, Strong perceived World War I as an
opportunity to
expand US participation in international finance, allowing New York to
move
toward coveted international-finance-center status to rival London’s
historical
preeminence, through the development of a commercial paper market, or
bankers'
acceptances in British finance parlance, breaking London’s long
monopoly. The
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 permitted the Federal Reserve Banks to buy,
or
rediscount, such paper. This allowed US banks in New York to play an
increasingly central role in international finance in competition with
the
London market.
Herbert Hoover, after losing his second-term US presidential election
to
Franklin D Roosevelt as a result of the 1929 crash, criticized Strong
as
"a mental annex to Europe", and blamed Strong's internationalist
commitment to facilitating Europe's postwar economic recovery for the
US
stock-market crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression that
robbed
Hoover of a second term. Europe's return to the gold standard, with
Britain’s
insistence on what Hoover termed a "fictitious rate" of US$4.86 to
the pound sterling, required Strong to expand US credit by keeping the
discount
rate unrealistically low and to manipulate the Fed’s open market
operations to
keep US interest rate low to ease market pressures on the overvalued
pound
sterling. Hoover, with justification, ascribed Strong’s
internationalist
policies to what he viewed as the malign persuasions of Norman and
other
European central bankers, especially Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank
and
Charles Rist of the Bank of France. From the mid-1920s onward, the US
experienced credit-pushed inflation, which fueled the stock-market
bubble that
finally collapsed in 1929.
Within the Federal Reserve System, Strong's low-rate policies of the
mid-1920s
also provoked substantial regional opposition, particularly from
Midwestern and
agricultural elements, who generally endorsed Hoover's subsequent
critical
analysis. Throughout the 1920s, two of the Federal Reserve Board's
directors,
Adolph C Miller, a professional economist, and Charles S Hamlin,
perennially
disapproved of the degree to which they believed Strong subordinated
domestic
to international considerations.
The fairness of Hoover's allegation is subject to debate, but the fact
that
there was a divergence of priority between the White House and the Fed
is
beyond dispute, as is the fact that what is good for the international
financial system may not always be good for a national economy. This is
evidenced today by the collapse of one economy after another under the
current
international finance architecture that all central banks support
instinctively
out of a sense of institutional solidarity. The
same issue has surfaced in today’s China
where regional financial centers such as Hong Kong and Shanghai are
vying for
the role of world financial center. To
do this, they must play by the rules of the international financial
system
which imposes a cost on the national economy. The nationalist vs.
internationalist conflict, as exemplified by the Hoover vs. Strong
conflict of
the 1930s, is also threatening the further integration of the European
Union. Behind the fundamental rationale
of protectionism is the rejection of the claim that internationalist
finance
places national development as its priority. The
Richardian theory of comparative advantage
of free trade is not the
issue.
The issue of government control over foreign loans also brought the
Fed,
dominated by Strong, into direct conflict with Hoover when the latter
was
Secretary of Commerce. Hoover believed that the US government should
have right
of approval on foreign loans based on national-interest considerations
and that
the proceeds of US loans should be spent on US goods and services.
Strong
opposed all such restrictions as undesirable government intervention in
free
trade and international finance and counterproductively protectionist.
Businesses
should be not only allowed, but encouraged to buy when it is cheapest
anywhere
in the world, including shopping for funds to borrow, a refrain that is
heard
tirelessly from free traders also today. Of course, the expanding
application
of the law of one price to more and more commodities, including the
price of
money, i.e. interest rates adjusted by exchange rates, makes such
dispute
academic. The only commodity exempt from
the law of one price is labor. This exemption makes the trade theory of
comparative
advantage a fantasy.
In July and August 1927, Strong, despite ominous data on mounting
market
speculation and inflation, pushed the Fed to lower the discount rate
from 4 to
3 percent to relieve market pressures again on the overvalued British
pound. In
July 1927, the central bankers of Great Britain, the United States,
France, and
Weimar Germany met on Long Island in the US to discuss means of
increasing
Britain’s gold reserves and stabilizing the European currency
situation.
Strong’s reduction of the discount rate and purchase of 12 million
pound
sterling, for which he paid the Bank of England in gold, appeared to
come
directly from that meeting. One of the French bankers in attendance,
Charles
Rist, reported that Strong said that US authorities would reduce the
discount
rate as "un petit coup de whisky for the stock exchange".
Strong pushed this reduction through the Fed despite strong opposition
from
Miller and fellow board member James McDougal of the Chicago Fed, who
represented Midwestern bankers, who generally did not share New York's
internationalist preoccupation.
Frank Altschul, partner in the New York branch of the transnational
investment
bank Lazard Freres, told Emile Moreau, the governor of the Bank of
France, that
“the reasons given by Mr Strong as justification for the reduction in
the
discount rate are being taken seriously by no one, and that everyone in
the
United States is convinced that Mr Strong wanted to aid Mr Norman by
supporting
the pound.” Other correspondence in Strong’s own files suggests that he
was
giving priority to international monetary conditions rather than to US
export
needs, contrary to his public arguments. Writing to Norman, who praised
his
handling of the affair as “masterly”, Strong described the US discount
rate
reduction as “our year’s contribution to reconstruction.” The Fed’s
ease in
1927 forced money to flow not into the overheated real economy, which
was
unable to absorb further investment, but into the speculative financial
market,
which led to the crash of 1929. Strong died in October 1928, one year
before
the crash, and was spared the pain of having to see the devastating
results of
his internationalist policies.
Scholarly debate still continues as to whether Strong's effort to
facilitate
European economic reconstruction compromised the US domestic economy
and, in
particular, led him to subordinate US monetary policies to
internationalist
demands. In 1930, the US economy had yet to dominate the world economy
as it
does now. There is, however, little disagreement that the overall
monetary strategy
of European central banks had been misguided in its reliance on the
restoration
of the gold standard. Critics suggest that the ambitious but misguided
commitment
of Strong, Norman, and other internationalist bankers to returning the
pound,
the mark, and other major European currencies to the gold standard at
overly-high
parities to gold, which they were then forced to maintain at all costs,
including indifference to deflation, had the effect of undercutting
Europe's
postwar economic recovery. Not only did Strong and his fellow central
bankers
through their monetary policies contribute to the Great Depression, but
their
continuing fixation on gold also acted as a straitjacket that in effect
precluded expansionist counter-cyclical measures.
The inflexibility of the gold standard and the central bankers’
determination
to defend their national currencies’ convertibility into gold at almost
any
cost drastically limited the policy options available to them when
responding
to the global financial crisis. This picture fits the situation of the
fixed-exchange-rates regime based on the fiat dollar that produced
recurring
financial crises in the 1990s and that has yet to run its full course
by 2005.
In 1927, Strong’s unconditional support of the gold standard, with the
objective of bringing about the rising financial predominance of the US
which
had the largest holdings of gold in the world, exacerbated nascent
international financial problems. In similar ways, dollar hegemony does
the
same damage to the global economy today. Just as the international gold
standard itself was one of the major factors underlying and
exacerbating the
Great Depression that followed the 1929 crash, since the conditions
that had
sustained it before the war no longer existed, the breakdown of the
fixed-exchange-rates
system based on a gold-backed dollar set up by the Bretton Woods regime
after
World War II, without the removal of the fiat dollar as a key reserve
currency
for trade and finance, will cause a total collapse of the current
international
financial architecture with equally tragic outcomes. Stripped of its
gold
backing, the fiat dollar has to rely on geopolitical factors for its
value,
which push US foreign policy towards increasing militaristic and
belligerent
unilateralism. With dollar hegemony today, as it was with the gold
standard of
1930, the trade war is fought through currencies valuations on top of
traditional tariffs.
The nature of and constraints on US internationalism after World War I
had
parallels in US internationalism after World War II and in US-led
globalization
after the Cold War. Hoover bitterly charged Strong with reckless
placement of
the interests of the international financial system ahead of US
national
interest and domestic development needs. Strong sincerely believed his
support
for European currency stabilization also promoted the best interests of
the
United States, as post-Cold War neo-liberal market fundamentalists
sincerely
believe its promotion enhances the US national interest. Unfortunately,
sincerity
is not a vaccine against falsehood.
Strong argued relentlessly that exchange rate volatility, especially
when the
dollar was at a premium against other currencies, made it difficult for
US
exporters to price their goods competitively. As he had done during the
war, on
numerous later occasions, Strong also stressed the need to prevent an
influx of
gold into the US and the consequent domestic inflation, by the US
making loans
to Europe, pursuing lenient debt policies, and accepting European
imports on generous
terms. Strong never questioned the gold parities set for the mark and
the pound
sterling. He merely accepted that returning the pound to gold at prewar
exchange rates required British deflation and US efforts to use lower
dollar interest
rates to alleviate market pressures on sterling. Like Fed chairman Paul
Volcker
in the 1980s, but unlike Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin in the 1990s,
Strong
mistook a cheap dollar as serving the national interest, while Rubin
understood
correctly that a strong dollar is in the national interest by
sustaining dollar
hegemony. In either case, the price for either an over-valued or
under-valued
dollar is the same: global depression. Dollar hegemony in the 1990s
pushed
Japan and Germany into prolonged depression.<>
The US position in 2005 is that a strong dollar is still in
the US national interest, but a strong dollar requires an even stronger
Chinese
yuan in the 21st century. Just as Strong saw the need for a
strong
British pound paid for by deflation in Britain in exchange for the
carrot of
continuing British/European imports to the US, Bush and Greenspan now
want a
stronger Chinese yuan, paid for with deflation in China in exchange for
curbing
US protectionism against Chinese imports. The
1985 Plaza Accord to force the
appreciation of the Japanese yen
marked the downward spiral of the Japanese economy via currency-induced
deflation. Another virtual Plaza Accord
forced the rise of the euro that left Europe with a stagnant economy. A
new
virtual Plaza Accord against China will also condemn the Chinese
economy into a
protracted period of deflation. Deflation
in China at this time will cause the
collapse of the Chinese
banking system which is weighted down by the BIS regulatory regime that
turned
national banking subsidies to state-own-enterprises into massive
non-performing
loans. A collapse of the Chinese banking system will have dire
consequences for
the global financial system since the robust Chinese economy is the
only engine
of growth in the world economy at this time.
When Norman sent Strong a copy of John Maynard Keynes’ Tract on
Monetary
Reform (1923), Strong commented “that some of his [Keynes’]
conclusions are
thoroughly unwarranted and show a great lack of knowledge of American
affairs
and of the Federal Reserve System.” Within a decade, Keynes, with his
advocacy
of demand management via deficit financing, became the most influential
economist in post-war history.
The major flaw in the European effort for post-World War I economic
reconstruction was its attempt to reconstruct the past through its
attachment
to the gold standard, with little vision of a new future. The
democratic
governments of the moneyed class that inherited power from the fall of
monarchies did not fully comprehend the implication of the
disappearance of the
monarch as a ruler, whose financial architecture they tried to continue
for the
benefit of their bourgeois class. The broadening of the political
franchise in
most European countries after the war had made it far more difficult
for governments
and central bankers to resist electoral pressures for increased social
spending
and the demand for ample liquidity with low interest rates, as well as
high
tolerance for moderate inflation to combat unemployment, regardless of
the
impact of national policies on the international financial
architecture. The
Fed, despite its claim of independence from politics, has never been
free of US
presidential-election politics since its founding. Shortly before his
untimely
death, Strong took comfort in his belief that the reconstruction of
Europe was
virtually completed and his internationalist policies had been
successful in
preserving world peace. Within a decade of his death, the whole world
was
aflame with World War II.<>
But in 1929, the dollar was still gold-backed. The government fixed the dollar at 23.22 grains
of gold, at
$20.67 per troy ounce. When stock prices rose faster than real
economic
growth, the dollar in effect depreciated. It
took more dollars to buy the same shares as
prices rose. But the price of gold
remained fixed at
$20.67 per ounce. Thus gold was cheap and the dollar was overvalued and
the
trading public rushed to buy gold, injecting cash into the economy
which fueled
more stock buying on margin. Price of gold mining shares rose by 600%.
But with
a gold standard, the Fed could not print money beyond its holding of
gold
without revaluing the dollar against gold. The
Quantity Theory of Money caught up with
the financial bubble as
prices for equity rose but the quantity of money remained constant and
it came
into play with a vengeance. Because of
the gold standard, there reached a time when there was no more money
available
to buy without someone first selling. When
the selling began, the debt bubble burst, and panic took over. When the
stock
market collapsed, panic selling quickly wiped out most investors who
bought
shares instead of gold. As gold price
was fixed, it could not fall with the general deflation and owners of
gold did
exceptionally well by comparison to share owners.
What Strong did not figure was that when the Fed lowered the
discount rate to relieve market pressure on the overvalued British
pound
sterling after its gold convertibility had been restored in 1925, the
world
economy could not expand because money tied to gold was inelastic,
leaving the
US economy with a financial bubble that was not supported by any rise
in
earnings. The British-controlled gold standard proved to be a
straightjacket
for world economic growth, not unlike the deflationary Maastricht
"convergence
criteria" based on the strong German mark of the late 1990’s. The
speculation of the Coolidge-Hoover era was encouraged by Norman and
Strong to
fight gold-induced deflation. The accommodative monetary policy of the
US
Federal Reserve led to a bubble economy in the US, similar to
Greenspan’s
bubble economy since 1987. There were two differences: the dollar was
gold-backed in 1930 while in 1987 it was a fiat currency; and in 1930,
the
world monetary system was based on sterling pound hegemony while today
it is
based on dollar hegemony. When the Wall Street bubble was approaching
unsustainable proportions in the autumn of 1929, giving the false
impression
that the US economy was booming, Norman sharply cut the British bank
rate to
try to stimulate the British economy in unison. When
short-term rates fell, it created serious
problems for British
transnational banks which were stuck with funds borrowed long-term at
high
interest rates that now could only be lent out short-term at low rates. They had to repatriating British hot money
from New York to cover this ruinous interest rate gap, leaving New York
speculators up the creek without an interest rate paddle.
This was the first case of hot money
contagion, albeit what hit the Asian banks in 1997 was the opposite:
they
borrowed short-term at low interest rates to lend out long-term at high
rates.
And when interest rates rose because of falling exchange rate of local
currencies, borrowers defaulted and the credit system collapsed.<>
The contagion in the 1997 Asian financial crisis devastated
all Asian economies. The financial collapse in Thailand and Indonesia
in July
1997 caused the strong markets of high liquidity such as Hong Kong and
Singapore to collapse when investors sold in these liquid markets to
raise funds
to rescue their positions in illiquid markets that were wrongly
diagnosed by
the IMF as mere passing storms that could be weathered with a temporary
shift
of liquidity. Following badly flawed IMF
advice, investors threw good money after bad and brought down the whole
regional economy while failing to contain the problem within Thailand.<>
The financial crises that began in Thailand in July 1997
caused sell-downs in other robust and liquid markets in the region such
as Hong
Kong and Singapore that impacted even Wall Street in October. But
prices fell
in Thailand not because domestic potential buyers had no money. The fact was that equity prices in Thailand
were holding in local currency terms but falling fast in foreign
exchange terms
when the peg of the baht to the dollar began to break.
Then as the baht devalued in a free fall,
stocks of Thai companies with local currency revenue, including healthy
export
firms that contracted local currency payments, logically collapsed
while those
with hard currency revenue actually appreciated in local currency terms. The margin calls were met as a result of
investors trying not to sell, rather than trying to liquidate at a loss. The incentive for holding on with additional
margin payments was based on IMF pronouncements that the crisis was
only
temporary and imminent help was on the way and that the problem would
stabilize
within months. But the promised help never come. What
came was an IMF program of imposed
“conditionalities” that pushed the troubled Asian economies off the
cliff,
designed only to save the foreign creditors. The
“temporary” financial crisis was pushed
into a multi-year economic
crisis.<>
Geopolitics played a large role. US Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin decided very early the Thai crisis was a minor Asian
problem and
told the IMF to solve it with an Asian solution but not to let Japan
take the
lead. Hong Kong contributed US$1 billion
and China contributed US$1 billion on blind faith on Rubin's assurance
that the
problem would be contained within Thai borders (after all, Thailand was
a
faithful US ally in the Cold War). Then
Korea was hit in December 1997. Rubin again thought it was another
temporary
Asian problem. The Korean Central Bank
was bleeding dollar reserves trying to support an overvalued won pegged
to the
dollar, and by late December had only several days left before its
dollar
reserves would run dry. Rubin was
holding on to his moral hazard posture until his aides in the
Department of
Treasury told him one Sunday morning that the Brazilians were holding a
lot of
Korean bonds. If Korea were to default,
Brazil would collapse and land the US banks in big trouble. Only then did Rubin get Citibank to work out a
restructuring the following Tuesday in Korea by getting the Fed to
allow the
American banks to roll over the short-term Korean debts into
non-interest
paying long-term debts without having to register them as
non-performing, thus
exempting the US banks from the adverse impacts of the required capital
injection that would drag down their profits.<>
The Great Depression that started in 1929 was made more
severe and protracted by the British default on gold payment in
September, 1931
and subsequent British competitive devaluations as a national strategy
for a
new international trade war. British policy involved a deliberate use
of pound
sterling hegemony, the only world monetary regime at that time, as a
national
monetary weapon in an international trade war, causing an irreversible
collapse
of world trade. In response to British
monetary moves, alternative currency blocs emerged in rising economies
such as
the German Third Reich and Imperial Japan. It
did not take these governments long to
realize that they had to go to
war to obtain the oil and other natural resources needed to sustain
their
growing economies that collapsed world trade could no longer deliver in
peace. For Britain and the US, a quick
war was exactly what was needed to bring their own economies out of
depression.
No one anticipated that WWII would be so destructive. German invasion
of Poland
on September 1, 1939 caused Britain and France to declared war on
Germany on
September 3, but the British and French stayed behind the Maginot Line
all
winter, content with a blockade of Germany by sea.
The inactive period of the “phony war” lasted
7 months until April 9, 1940 when Germany invaded Demark and Norway. On
May 10,
German forces overrun Luxemburg and invaded the Netherlands and
Belgium. On
March 13, they outflanked the Maginot Line and German panzer divisions
raced towards
the British Channel, cut off Flanders and trapped the entire British
Expeditionary Force of 220,000 and 120,000 French troops at Dunkirk.
The
trapped Allied forces had to be evacuated by civilian small crafts from
May 26
to June 4. On June 22, France capitulated. If Britain had failed to evacuate its troops
from Dunkirk, it would have to sue for peace as many had expected, the
war
would have been over with German control of Europe. Unable to use
Britain as a
base, US forces would never be able to land in Europe. Without a
two-front war,
Germany might have been able to prevail over the USSR. Germany might
have then
emerged as the hegemon.
Franklin D. Roosevelt was
inaugurated as president on March 4, 1933. In his first fireside
chat
radio address, Roosevelt told a panicky public that “the confidence of
the
people themselves” was “more important than gold.”
On March 9, the
Senate quickly passed the Emergency Banking Act giving the Secretary of
the
Treasury the power to compel every person and business in the country
to
relinquish their gold and accept paper currency in exchange. The next day, Friday March 10, Roosevelt issued
Executive
Order No. 6073, forbidding the public from sending gold overseas and
forbidding
banks from paying out gold for dollar. On
April 5, Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 6102 to confiscate the
public’s
gold, by commanding all to deliver their gold and gold certificates to
a
Federal Reserve Bank, where they would be paid in paper money. Citizens
could
keep up to $100 in gold, but anything above that was illegal. Gold had
become a
controlled substance by law in the US. Possession was punishable by a
fine of
up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to 10 years. On January 31, 1934, Roosevelt issued another
Executive
Order to devalue the dollar by 59.06% of its former gold quantum of
23.22
grains, pushing the dollar down to be worth only13.71 grains of gold,
at $35
per ounce, which lasted until 1971.
1929 Revisited and
More
Shortsighted government monetary policies were the main factors
that led to the market collapse but the subsequent Great Depression was
caused
by the collapse of world trade. US policymakers in the 1920s believed
that
business was the purpose of society, just as policymakers today believe
that
free trade is the purpose of civilization. Thus, the government took no
action
against unconstructive speculation believing that the market knew best
and
would be self-correcting. People who took risks should bear the
consequences of
their own actions. The flaw in this view
was that the consequences of speculation were largely borne not by
professional
speculators, but by the unsophisticated public who were unqualified to
understand how they were being manipulated to buy high and sell low.
The
economy had been based on speculation but the risks were unevenly
carried
mostly by the innocent. National wealth from speculation was not spread
evenly.
Instead, most money was in the hands of a rich few who quickly passed
on the
risk and kept the profit. They saved or invested rather than spent
their money
on goods and services. Thus, supply soon became greater than demand.
Some
people profited, but the majority did not. Prices went up faster than
income
and the public could afford things only by going into debt while their
disposable income went into mindless speculation in hope of magically
bailing
borrowers out from such debts. Farmers and factory/office workers did
not
profit at all. Unevenness of prosperity made recovery difficult because
income
was concentrated on those who did not have to spend it.
The situation today is very similar.
After the 1929 crash, Congress tried to solve
the high unemployment problem by passing high tariffs that protected US
industries but hurt US farmers. International trade came to a stand
still both because
of protectionism and the freezing up of trade finance.
<>
This time, world trade may also collapse, and high tariffs will again
be the
effect rather than the cause. The pending collapse of world trade will
again come
as a result of protracted US exploitation of the advantages of dollar
hegemony,
as the British did in 1930 regarding sterling pound hegemony. The dollar is undeservedly the main trade
currency without either the backing of gold or US fiscal and monetary
discipline. Most of the things people want to buy are no longer made in
the US,
so the dollar has become an unnatural trade currency. The system will
collapse
because despite huge US trade deficits, there is no global recycling of
money
outside of the dollar economy. All money circulates only within the
dollar
money supply, overheating the US economy, financing its domestic
joyrides and
globalization tentacles, not to mention military adventurism, milking
the rest
of the global economy dry and depriving the non-dollar economies of
needed purchasing
power independent of the US trade deficit. World trade will collapse
this time
not because of trade restricting tariffs, which are merely temporary
distractions, but because of a global mal-distribution of purchasing
power
created by dollar hegemony.
Central banking was adopted in the US
in 1913 to provide
elasticity to the money supply to accommodate the ebb and flow of the
business
cycle. Yet the mortal enemy of elasticity is structural fatigue which
is what
makes the rubber band snap. Today, dollar
hegemony cuts off monetary recirculation to all non-dollar economies,
forcing
all exporting nations with mounting trade surpluses into the position
of Samuel
Taylor Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner: “Water, water, everywhere, nor any
drop to
drink.”
Next: Trade in the Age of
Overcapacity
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